@@ -956,45 +956,6 @@ check_key(struct key *key, const struct key_type *kt)
return true;
}
-/*
- * Make safe mutations to key to ensure it is valid,
- * such as ensuring correct parity on DES keys.
- *
- * This routine cannot guarantee it will generate a good
- * key. You must always call check_key after this routine
- * to make sure.
- */
-void
-fixup_key(struct key *key, const struct key_type *kt)
-{
- struct gc_arena gc = gc_new();
- if (kt->cipher)
- {
-#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG
- const struct key orig = *key;
-#endif
- const int ndc = key_des_num_cblocks(kt->cipher);
-
- if (ndc)
- {
- key_des_fixup(key->cipher, kt->cipher_length, ndc);
- }
-
-#ifdef ENABLE_DEBUG
- if (check_debug_level(D_CRYPTO_DEBUG))
- {
- if (memcmp(orig.cipher, key->cipher, kt->cipher_length))
- {
- dmsg(D_CRYPTO_DEBUG, "CRYPTO INFO: fixup_key: before=%s after=%s",
- format_hex(orig.cipher, kt->cipher_length, 0, &gc),
- format_hex(key->cipher, kt->cipher_length, 0, &gc));
- }
- }
-#endif
- }
- gc_free(&gc);
-}
-
void
check_replay_consistency(const struct key_type *kt, bool packet_id)
{
@@ -1043,10 +1004,6 @@ generate_key_random(struct key *key, const struct key_type *kt)
dmsg(D_SHOW_KEY_SOURCE, "Cipher source entropy: %s", format_hex(key->cipher, cipher_len, 0, &gc));
dmsg(D_SHOW_KEY_SOURCE, "HMAC source entropy: %s", format_hex(key->hmac, hmac_len, 0, &gc));
- if (kt)
- {
- fixup_key(key, kt);
- }
} while (kt && !check_key(key, kt));
gc_free(&gc);
@@ -1589,9 +1546,6 @@ verify_fix_key2(struct key2 *key2, const struct key_type *kt, const char *shared
for (i = 0; i < key2->n; ++i)
{
- /* Fix parity for DES keys and make sure not a weak key */
- fixup_key(&key2->keys[i], kt);
-
/* This should be a very improbable failure */
if (!check_key(&key2->keys[i], kt))
{
@@ -288,8 +288,6 @@ void check_replay_consistency(const struct key_type *kt, bool packet_id);
bool check_key(struct key *key, const struct key_type *kt);
-void fixup_key(struct key *key, const struct key_type *kt);
-
bool write_key(const struct key *key, const struct key_type *kt,
struct buffer *buf);
@@ -170,15 +170,6 @@ int key_des_num_cblocks(const cipher_kt_t *kt);
*/
bool key_des_check(uint8_t *key, int key_len, int ndc);
-/*
- * Fix the given DES key, setting its parity to odd.
- *
- * @param key Key to check
- * @param key_len Length of the key, in bytes
- * @param ndc Number of DES cblocks that the key is made up of.
- */
-void key_des_fixup(uint8_t *key, int key_len, int ndc);
-
/**
* Encrypt the given block, using DES ECB mode
*
@@ -422,11 +422,6 @@ key_des_check(uint8_t *key, int key_len, int ndc)
msg(D_CRYPT_ERRORS, "CRYPTO INFO: check_key_DES: weak key detected");
goto err;
}
- if (0 != mbedtls_des_key_check_key_parity(key))
- {
- msg(D_CRYPT_ERRORS, "CRYPTO INFO: check_key_DES: bad parity detected");
- goto err;
- }
}
return true;
@@ -434,25 +429,6 @@ err:
return false;
}
-void
-key_des_fixup(uint8_t *key, int key_len, int ndc)
-{
- int i;
- struct buffer b;
-
- buf_set_read(&b, key, key_len);
- for (i = 0; i < ndc; ++i)
- {
- unsigned char *key = buf_read_alloc(&b, MBEDTLS_DES_KEY_SIZE);
- if (!key)
- {
- msg(D_CRYPT_ERRORS, "CRYPTO INFO: fixup_key_DES: insufficient key material");
- return;
- }
- mbedtls_des_key_set_parity(key);
- }
-}
-
/*
*
* Generic cipher key type functions
@@ -546,12 +546,6 @@ key_des_check(uint8_t *key, int key_len, int ndc)
"CRYPTO INFO: check_key_DES: weak key detected");
goto err;
}
- if (!DES_check_key_parity(dc))
- {
- crypto_msg(D_CRYPT_ERRORS,
- "CRYPTO INFO: check_key_DES: bad parity detected");
- goto err;
- }
}
return true;
@@ -563,27 +557,6 @@ err:
#endif
}
-void
-key_des_fixup(uint8_t *key, int key_len, int ndc)
-{
- int i;
- struct buffer b;
-
- buf_set_read(&b, key, key_len);
- for (i = 0; i < ndc; ++i)
- {
- DES_cblock *dc = (DES_cblock *) buf_read_alloc(&b, sizeof(DES_cblock));
- if (!dc)
- {
- msg(D_CRYPT_ERRORS, "CRYPTO INFO: fixup_key_DES: insufficient key material");
- ERR_clear_error();
- return;
- }
- DES_set_odd_parity(dc);
- }
-}
-
-
/*
*
* Generic cipher key type functions
@@ -67,7 +67,6 @@ create_des_keys(const unsigned char *hash, unsigned char *key)
key[5] = ((hash[4] & 31) << 3) | (hash[5] >> 5);
key[6] = ((hash[5] & 63) << 2) | (hash[6] >> 6);
key[7] = ((hash[6] & 127) << 1);
- key_des_fixup(key, 8, 1);
}
static void
@@ -1739,24 +1739,6 @@ generate_key_expansion_openvpn_prf(const struct tls_session *session, struct key
}
secure_memzero(&master, sizeof(master));
-
-
- /*
- * fixup_key only correctly sets DES parity bits if the cipher is a
- * DES variant.
- *
- * The newer OpenSSL and mbed TLS libraries (those that support EKM)
- * ignore these bits.
- *
- * We keep the DES fixup here as compatibility.
- * OpenVPN3 never did this fixup anyway. So this code is *probably* not
- * required but we keep it for compatibility until we remove DES support
- * since it does not hurt either.
- */
- for (int i = 0; i < 2; ++i)
- {
- fixup_key(&key2->keys[i], &session->opt->key_type);
- }
key2->n = 2;
return true;
This code mainly sets the parity bits in the DES keys. As mbed TLS and OpenSSL already ignore these bits in the DES key and since DES is deprecated, remove this special DES code that is not even needed by the libraries. Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe <arne@rfc2549.org> --- src/openvpn/crypto.c | 46 ------------------------------------ src/openvpn/crypto.h | 2 -- src/openvpn/crypto_backend.h | 9 ------- src/openvpn/crypto_mbedtls.c | 24 ------------------- src/openvpn/crypto_openssl.c | 27 --------------------- src/openvpn/ntlm.c | 1 - src/openvpn/ssl.c | 18 -------------- 7 files changed, 127 deletions(-)