[Openvpn-devel,v2] tls-crypt-v2: add specification to doc/

Message ID 20180308202303.6492-1-steffan@karger.me
State Superseded
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  • [Openvpn-devel,v2] tls-crypt-v2: add specification to doc/
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Commit Message

Steffan Karger March 8, 2018, 8:23 p.m.
From: Steffan Karger <steffan.karger@fox-it.com>

This is a preliminary description of tls-crypt-v2.  It should give a good
impression about the reasoning and design behind tls-crypt-v2, but might
need some polishing and updating.

Signed-off-by: Steffan Karger <steffan.karger@fox-it.com>
---
v2: update text for --tls-crypt-v2-genkey, fix typo

 doc/tls-crypt-v2.txt | 165 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 165 insertions(+)
 create mode 100644 doc/tls-crypt-v2.txt

Comments

Antonio Quartulli April 16, 2018, 1:03 p.m. | #1
Hi,

there was a comment in my previous review that remained unanswer.
Please, see it below

On 09/03/18 04:23, Steffan Karger wrote:
[CUT]
> +   The metadata is checked *after* the OpenVPN three-way handshake has
> +   completed, to prevent DoS attacks.  (That is, once the client has proved to
> +   the server that it possesses Kc, by authenticating a packet that contains the
> +   session ID picked by the server.)


just a thought here: the metadata is actually created by the
server/provider and it is authenticated/encrypted with the server key.

Isn't this enough to ensure that its content is not malicious and thus
allow the server to parse it right after having received the
HARD_RESET_V3 (instead of performing a "three-way handshake" first)?


Cheers,
Steffan Karger May 2, 2018, 5:51 p.m. | #2
Hi Antonio,

Sorry for taking so long to respond - life was getting in the way.

On 16-04-18 15:03, Antonio Quartulli wrote:
> there was a comment in my previous review that remained unanswer.
> Please, see it below
> 
> On 09/03/18 04:23, Steffan Karger wrote:
> [CUT]
>> +   The metadata is checked *after* the OpenVPN three-way handshake has
>> +   completed, to prevent DoS attacks.  (That is, once the client has proved to
>> +   the server that it possesses Kc, by authenticating a packet that contains the
>> +   session ID picked by the server.)
> 
> 
> just a thought here: the metadata is actually created by the
> server/provider and it is authenticated/encrypted with the server key.
> 
> Isn't this enough to ensure that its content is not malicious and thus
> allow the server to parse it right after having received the
> HARD_RESET_V3 (instead of performing a "three-way handshake" first)?

Not really, because a mitm attacker can simply record the cookie, and
replay it.  By postponing our parsing, we reduce the impact of a DoS by
an attacker that is setting up many new connections with the cookie
attached.  Instead of performing a potential expensive check (running a
script) for each HARD_RESET_V3, all we do is unwrap and reply.  In more
formal terms, we require a proof-of-possession of Kc before we will do
any (potential) expensive operations.

-Steffan

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Patch

diff --git a/doc/tls-crypt-v2.txt b/doc/tls-crypt-v2.txt
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..cb061aee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/doc/tls-crypt-v2.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@ 
+Client-specific tls-crypt keys (--tls-crypt-v2)
+===============================================
+
+This document describes the ``--tls-crypt-v2`` option, which enables OpenVPN
+to use client-specific ``--tls-crypt`` keys.
+
+Rationale
+---------
+
+``--tls-auth`` and ``tls-crypt`` use a pre-shared group key, which is shared
+among all client and servers in an OpenVPN deployment.  If any client or
+server is compromised, the attacker will have access to this shared key, and it
+will no longer provide any security.  To reduce the risk of losing pre-shared
+keys, ``tls-crypt-v2`` adds the ability to supply each client with a unique
+tls-crypt key.  This allows large organisations and VPN providers to profit
+from the same DoS and TLS stack protection that small deployments can already
+achieve using ``tls-auth`` or ``tls-crypt``.
+
+Also, for ``tls-crypt``, even if all these peers succeed in keeping the key
+secret, the key lifetime is limited to roughly 8000 years, divided by the
+number of clients (see the ``--tls-crypt`` section of the man page).  Using
+client-specific keys, we lift this lifetime requirement to roughly 8000 years
+for each client key (which "Should Be Enough For Everybody (tm)").
+
+
+Introduction
+------------
+
+``tls-crypt-v2`` uses an encrypted cookie mechanism to introduce
+client-specific tls-crypt keys without introducing a lot of server-side state.
+The client-specific key is encrypted using a server key.  The server key is the
+same for all servers in a group.  When a client connects, it first sends the
+encrypted key to the server, such that the server can decrypt the key and all
+messages can thereafter be encrypted using the client-specific key.
+
+A wrapped (encrypted and authenticated) client-specific key can also contain
+metadata.  The metadata is wrapped together with the key, and can be used to
+allow servers to identify clients and/or key validity.  This allows the server
+to abort the connection immediately after receiving the first packet, rather
+than performing an entire TLS handshake.  Aborting the connection this early
+greatly improves the DoS resilience and reduces attack service against
+malicious clients that have the ``tls-crypt`` or ``tls-auth`` key.  This is
+particularly relevant for large deployments (think lost key or disgruntled
+employee) and VPN providers (client are not trusted).
+
+To allow for a smooth transition, ``tls-crypt-v2`` is designed such that a
+server can enable both ``tls-crypt-v2`` and either ``tls-crypt`` or
+``tls-auth``.  This is achieved by introducing a P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V3
+opcode, that indicates that the client wants to use ``tls-crypt-v2`` for the
+current connection.
+
+For an exact specification and more details, read the Implementation section.
+
+
+Implementation
+--------------
+
+When setting up a tls-crypt-v2 group (similar to generating a tls-crypt or
+tls-auth key previously):
+
+1. Generate a tls-crypt-v2 server key using ``--tls-crypt-v2-genkey``.  This
+   key contains 2 512-bit keys, of which we use:
+
+   * the first 256 bits of key 1 as AES-256-CTR encryption key ``Ke``
+   * the first 256 bits of key 2 as HMAC-SHA-256 authentication key ``Ka``
+
+2. Add the tls-crypt-v2 server key to all server configs
+   (``tls-crypt-v2 /path/to/server.key``)
+
+
+When provisioning a client, create a client-specific tls-crypt key:
+
+1. Generate 2048 bits client-specific key ``Kc``
+2. Optionally generate metadata
+3. Create a wrapped client key ``WKc``, using the same nonce-misuse-resistant
+   SIV conruction we use for tls-crypt:
+
+   ``T = HMAC-SHA256(Ka, Kc || metadata)``
+
+   ``IV = 128 most significant bits of T``
+
+   ``WKc = T || AES-256-CTR(Ke, IV, Kc || metadata)``
+
+4. Create a tls-crypt-v2 client key using ``--tls-crypto-v2-genkey``.  This
+   PEM-encodes ``Kc || WKc`` and stores it in a file, using the header
+   ``-----BEGIN OpenVPN tls-crypt-v2 client key-----`` and the footer
+   ``-----END OpenVPN tls-crypt-v2 client key-----``.  (The PEM format is
+   simple, and following PEM allows us to use the crypto lib function for
+   en/decoding.)
+5. Add the tls-crypt-v2 client key to the client config
+   (``tls-crypt-v2 /path/to/client-specific.key``)
+
+
+When setting up the openvpn connection:
+
+1. The client reads the tls-crypt-v2 key from its config, and:
+
+   1. loads ``Kc`` as its tls-crypt key,
+   2. stores ``WKc`` in memory for sending to the server.
+
+2. To start the connection, the client creates a P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V3
+   message without payload, wraps it with tls-crypt using ``Kc`` as the key,
+   and appends ``WKc``.  (``WKc`` must not be encrypted, to prevent a
+   chicken-and-egg problem.)
+
+3. The server receives the P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V3 message, and
+
+   a. unwraps ``WKc`` and strips ``WKc`` from the message.
+   b. uses unwrapped ``Kc`` to verify the remaining
+      P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V3 message's authentication.
+
+   The message is dropped and no error response is sent when either a or b
+   fails (DoS protection).
+
+4. Server optionally checks metadata using a --tls-crypt-v2-verify script
+
+   Metadata could for example contain the users certificate serial, such that
+   the incoming connection can be verified against a CRL, or a notAfter
+   timestamp that limits the key's validity period.
+
+   This allows early abort of connection, *before* we expose any of the
+   notoriously dangerous TLS, X.509 and ASN.1 parsers and thereby reduces the
+   attack surface of the server.
+
+   The metadata is checked *after* the OpenVPN three-way handshake has
+   completed, to prevent DoS attacks.  (That is, once the client has proved to
+   the server that it possesses Kc, by authenticating a packet that contains the
+   session ID picked by the server.)
+
+   RFC: should the server send a 'key rejected' message if the key is e.g.
+   revoked or expired?  That allows for better client-side error reporting, but
+   also reduces the DoS resilience.
+
+6. Client and server use ``Kc`` for (un)wrapping any following control channel
+   messages.
+
+
+Considerations
+--------------
+
+To allow for a smooth transition, the server implementation allows
+``tls-crypt`` or ``tls-auth`` to be used simultaneously with ``tls-crypt-v2``.
+This specification does not allow simultaneously using ``tls-crypt-v2`` and
+connections without any control channel wrapping, because that would break DoS
+resilience.  RFC: should we add an option along the lines of
+--tls-crypt-v2-allow-insecure-fallback to allow admins to enable this anyway?
+It might help with transitioning.
+
+``tls-crypt-v2`` uses fixed crypto algorithms, because:
+
+ * The crypto is used before we can do any negotiation, so the algorithms have
+   to be predefined.
+ * The crypto primitives are chosen conservatively, making problems with these
+   primitives unlikely.
+ * Making anything configurable adds complexity, both in implementation and
+   usage.  We should not add anymore complexity than is absolutely necessary.
+
+Potential ``tls-crypt-v2`` risks:
+
+ * Slightly more work on first connection (``WKc`` unwrap + hard reset unwrap)
+   than with ``tls-crypt`` (hard reset unwrap) or ``tls-auth`` (hard reset auth).
+ * Flexible metadata allow mistakes
+   (So we should make it easy to do it right.  Provide tooling to create client
+   keys based on cert serial + CA fingerprint, provide script that uses CRL (if
+   available) to drop revoked keys.)