[Openvpn-devel] openssl: alternative names support for --verify-x509-name CN checks
Commit Message
when using "--verify-x509-name [hostname] name" hostname will now be accepted
also when matched against one of the X509v3 Subject Alternative Name IP or DNS
entries (instead of just Subject's CN).
see also: https://github.com/OpenVPN/openvpn/pull/136/
Signed-off-by: Mateusz Markowicz <poniekad@protonmail.com>
---
src/openvpn/options.c | 4 +++
src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c | 18 +++++++++++---
src/openvpn/ssl_verify.h | 1 +
src/openvpn/ssl_verify_backend.h | 7 ++++++
src/openvpn/ssl_verify_mbedtls.c | 11 +++++++++
src/openvpn/ssl_verify_openssl.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
6 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
--
2.20.1
Comments
Am 10.02.20 um 18:59 schrieb Mateusz Markowicz via Openvpn-devel:
> when using "--verify-x509-name [hostname] name" hostname will now be
> accepted
> also when matched against one of the X509v3 Subject Alternative Name IP
> or DNS
> entries (instead of just Subject's CN).
>
> see also: https://github.com/OpenVPN/openvpn/pull/136/
>
> Signed-off-by: Mateusz Markowicz <poniekad@protonmail.com
> <mailto:poniekad@protonmail.com>>
If this should have a chance of being included it needs to cover mbed
TLS as well.
Also documentation in the man page is missing.
> ---
> src/openvpn/options.c | 4 +++
> src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c | 18 +++++++++++---
> src/openvpn/ssl_verify.h | 1 +
> src/openvpn/ssl_verify_backend.h | 7 ++++++
> src/openvpn/ssl_verify_mbedtls.c | 11 +++++++++
> src/openvpn/ssl_verify_openssl.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 6 files changed, 80 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/src/openvpn/options.c b/src/openvpn/options.c
> index 173a1eea..438dfff0 100644
> --- a/src/openvpn/options.c
> +++ b/src/openvpn/options.c
> @@ -8144,6 +8144,10 @@ add_option(struct options *options,
> {
> type = VERIFY_X509_SUBJECT_RDN_PREFIX;
> }
> + else if (streq(p[2], "subject-alt-name"))
> + {
> + type = VERIFY_X509_SAN;
> + }
> else
> {
> msg(msglevel, "unknown X.509 name type: %s", p[2]);
> diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c b/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c
> index 65188d23..6480b5eb 100644
> --- a/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c
> +++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.c
> @@ -390,15 +390,27 @@ verify_peer_cert(const struct tls_options *opt,
> openvpn_x509_cert_t *peer_cert,
> /* verify X509 name or username against --verify-x509-[user]name */
> if (opt->verify_x509_type != VERIFY_X509_NONE)
> {
> - if ( (opt->verify_x509_type == VERIFY_X509_SUBJECT_DN
> + bool match;
> + if (opt->verify_x509_type == VERIFY_X509_SAN)
> + {
> + bool have_alt_names;
> + match = x509v3_is_host_in_alternative_names(peer_cert,
> opt->verify_x509_name, &have_alt_names)
> + || (!have_alt_names &&
> strcmp(opt->verify_x509_name, common_name) == 0);
I know that this technically correct C but setting a variable in the
first part of via & and then using it in the second part feels like not
good style. I would rather like too a bit more verbose and less clever
code that is easier to understand.
> + }
> + else
> + {
> + match = (opt->verify_x509_type == VERIFY_X509_SUBJECT_DN
> && strcmp(opt->verify_x509_name, subject) == 0)
> || (opt->verify_x509_type == VERIFY_X509_SUBJECT_RDN
> && strcmp(opt->verify_x509_name, common_name) == 0)
> || (opt->verify_x509_type == VERIFY_X509_SUBJECT_RDN_PREFIX
> && strncmp(opt->verify_x509_name, common_name,
> - strlen(opt->verify_x509_name)) == 0) )
> + strlen(opt->verify_x509_name)) == 0);
> + }
> +
> + if (match)
> {
> - msg(D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY X509NAME OK: %s", subject);
> + msg(D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY X509NAME OK: %s",
> opt->verify_x509_name);
This changes the log message. If you want to verify that the cert prefix
with OVPN-client or something you don't get to see what certificate you
accepted anymore. If you want to log opt->verify_x509_name that needs to
be in addition.
> }
> else
> {
> diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.h b/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.h
> index c54b89a6..1295e76b 100644
> --- a/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.h
> +++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_verify.h
> @@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ struct cert_hash_set {
> #define VERIFY_X509_SUBJECT_DN 1
> #define VERIFY_X509_SUBJECT_RDN 2
> #define VERIFY_X509_SUBJECT_RDN_PREFIX 3
> +#define VERIFY_X509_SAN 4
>
> #define TLS_AUTHENTICATION_SUCCEEDED 0
> #define TLS_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED 1
> diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_backend.h
> b/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_backend.h
> index d6b31bfa..927a5a29 100644
> --- a/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_backend.h
> +++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_backend.h
> @@ -268,4 +268,11 @@ result_t x509_write_pem(FILE *peercert_file,
> openvpn_x509_cert_t *peercert);
> */
> bool tls_verify_crl_missing(const struct tls_options *opt);
>
> +/**
> + * Return true iff {host} was found in {cert} Subject Alternative Names
> DNS or IP entries.
> + * If {has_alt_names} != NULL it'll return true iff Subject Alternative
> Names were defined
> + * for {cert}.
> + */
> +bool x509v3_is_host_in_alternative_names(openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert,
> const char *host, bool *has_alt_names);
> +
> #endif /* SSL_VERIFY_BACKEND_H_ */
> diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_mbedtls.c
> b/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_mbedtls.c
> index fd31bbbd..2f2e04be 100644
> --- a/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_mbedtls.c
> +++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_verify_mbedtls.c
> @@ -245,6 +245,17 @@ x509_get_subject(mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, struct
> gc_arena *gc)
> return subject;
> }
>
> +bool
> +x509v3_is_host_in_alternative_names(mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, const char
> *host, bool *has_alt_names)
> +{
> + msg(M_WARN, "Missing support for subject alternative names in
> mbedtls.");
> + if (has_alt_names != NULL)
> + {
> + *has_alt_names = false;
> + }
> + return false;
> +}
*has_alt_names = (has_alt_names != NULL);
On 12/02/2020 15:39, Arne Schwabe wrote:
>> +bool
>> +x509v3_is_host_in_alternative_names(mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, const char
>> *host, bool *has_alt_names)
>> +{
>> + msg(M_WARN, "Missing support for subject alternative names in
>> mbedtls.");
I'm not happy about this at all. This should be possible to achieve with
mbed TLS as well:
<https://tls.mbed.org/api/structmbedtls__x509__crt.html#a1f148e8fb52e03e2604e716386a07df4>
One starting point for this can probably found here:
<https://tls.mbed.org/api/group__x509__module.html#ga033567483649030f7f859db4f4cb7e14>
@@ -8144,6 +8144,10 @@ add_option(struct options *options,
{
type = VERIFY_X509_SUBJECT_RDN_PREFIX;
}
+ else if (streq(p[2], "subject-alt-name"))
+ {
+ type = VERIFY_X509_SAN;
+ }
else
{
msg(msglevel, "unknown X.509 name type: %s", p[2]);
@@ -390,15 +390,27 @@ verify_peer_cert(const struct tls_options *opt, openvpn_x509_cert_t *peer_cert,
/* verify X509 name or username against --verify-x509-[user]name */
if (opt->verify_x509_type != VERIFY_X509_NONE)
{
- if ( (opt->verify_x509_type == VERIFY_X509_SUBJECT_DN
+ bool match;
+ if (opt->verify_x509_type == VERIFY_X509_SAN)
+ {
+ bool have_alt_names;
+ match = x509v3_is_host_in_alternative_names(peer_cert, opt->verify_x509_name, &have_alt_names)
+ || (!have_alt_names && strcmp(opt->verify_x509_name, common_name) == 0);
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ match = (opt->verify_x509_type == VERIFY_X509_SUBJECT_DN
&& strcmp(opt->verify_x509_name, subject) == 0)
|| (opt->verify_x509_type == VERIFY_X509_SUBJECT_RDN
&& strcmp(opt->verify_x509_name, common_name) == 0)
|| (opt->verify_x509_type == VERIFY_X509_SUBJECT_RDN_PREFIX
&& strncmp(opt->verify_x509_name, common_name,
- strlen(opt->verify_x509_name)) == 0) )
+ strlen(opt->verify_x509_name)) == 0);
+ }
+
+ if (match)
{
- msg(D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY X509NAME OK: %s", subject);
+ msg(D_HANDSHAKE, "VERIFY X509NAME OK: %s", opt->verify_x509_name);
}
else
{
@@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ struct cert_hash_set {
#define VERIFY_X509_SUBJECT_DN 1
#define VERIFY_X509_SUBJECT_RDN 2
#define VERIFY_X509_SUBJECT_RDN_PREFIX 3
+#define VERIFY_X509_SAN 4
#define TLS_AUTHENTICATION_SUCCEEDED 0
#define TLS_AUTHENTICATION_FAILED 1
@@ -268,4 +268,11 @@ result_t x509_write_pem(FILE *peercert_file, openvpn_x509_cert_t *peercert);
*/
bool tls_verify_crl_missing(const struct tls_options *opt);
+/**
+ * Return true iff {host} was found in {cert} Subject Alternative Names DNS or IP entries.
+ * If {has_alt_names} != NULL it'll return true iff Subject Alternative Names were defined
+ * for {cert}.
+ */
+bool x509v3_is_host_in_alternative_names(openvpn_x509_cert_t *cert, const char *host, bool *has_alt_names);
+
#endif /* SSL_VERIFY_BACKEND_H_ */
@@ -245,6 +245,17 @@ x509_get_subject(mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, struct gc_arena *gc)
return subject;
}
+bool
+x509v3_is_host_in_alternative_names(mbedtls_x509_crt *cert, const char *host, bool *has_alt_names)
+{
+ msg(M_WARN, "Missing support for subject alternative names in mbedtls.");
+ if (has_alt_names != NULL)
+ {
+ *has_alt_names = false;
+ }
+ return false;
+}
+
static void
do_setenv_x509(struct env_set *es, const char *name, char *value, int depth)
{
@@ -364,6 +364,48 @@ err:
return subject;
}
+bool
+x509v3_is_host_in_alternative_names(X509 *cert, const char *host, bool *has_alt_names)
+{
+ GENERAL_NAMES* altnames = X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
+ if (has_alt_names != NULL)
+ {
+ *has_alt_names = altnames != NULL;
+ }
+ if (altnames == NULL)
+ {
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ int n = sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(altnames);
+ for (int i = 0; i < n; i++)
+ {
+ GENERAL_NAME* altname = sk_GENERAL_NAME_value(altnames, i);
+ ASN1_STRING *altname_asn1 = NULL;
+ if (altname->type == GEN_DNS)
+ {
+ altname_asn1 = altname->d.dNSName;
+ }
+ else if (altname->type == GEN_IPADD)
+ {
+ altname_asn1 = altname->d.iPAddress;
+ }
+
+ if (altname_asn1 != NULL)
+ {
+ char* altname_cstr = NULL;
+ if (ASN1_STRING_to_UTF8((unsigned char **)&altname_cstr, altname_asn1) >= 0) {
+ bool match = strcmp(host, altname_cstr) == 0;
+ OPENSSL_free(altname_cstr);
+ if (match)
+ {
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ return false;
+}
/*
* x509-track implementation -- save X509 fields to environment,