| Message ID | 20191021113506.30377-1-santtu.lakkala@jolla.com |
|---|---|
| State | Accepted |
| Headers | show |
| Series | [Openvpn-devel] Fix OpenSSL private key passphrase notices | expand |
Hi, On 21-10-2019 13:35, Santtu Lakkala wrote: > Clear error stack on successful certificate loading in > tls_ctx_load_cert_file_and_copy() and handle errors also for > PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey() call in tls_ctx_load_priv_file(). > > Due to certificate loading possibly leaking non-fatal errors on OpenSSL > error stack, and some slight oversights in error handling, the > >> PASSWORD:Verification Failed: 'Private Key' > > line was never produced on the management channel for PEM formatted keys. > > Signed-off-by: Santtu Lakkala <santtu.lakkala@jolla.com> > --- > src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c | 11 +++++------ > 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c b/src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c > index 07916c3c..74c8fa65 100644 > --- a/src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c > +++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c > @@ -921,6 +921,10 @@ end: > crypto_msg(M_FATAL, "Cannot load certificate file %s", cert_file); > } > } > + else > + { > + crypto_print_openssl_errors(M_DEBUG); > + } > > if (in != NULL) > { > @@ -963,12 +967,7 @@ tls_ctx_load_priv_file(struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, const char *priv_key_file, > pkey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(in, NULL, > SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb(ctx->ctx), > SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb_userdata(ctx->ctx)); > - if (!pkey) > - { > - goto end; > - } > - > - if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ssl_ctx, pkey)) > + if (!pkey || !SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ssl_ctx, pkey)) > { > #ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT > if (management && (ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_error()) == EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT)) > Thanks, and apologies for the late repsonse. This patch does was it says, and looks good to me. I think this one should go into both master and release/2.4. Acked-by: Steffan Karger <steffan@karger.me> -Steffan
Your patch has been applied to the master and release/2.4 branch.
I haven't done any sort of qualified code review, but I have done a
few test builds / t_client test runs, and all looks good. If Steffan
says so, *and* it compiles, it's good enough for me anyway :-)
Sorry for the delay... "interesting times".
commit f67efa9412a62f477aa17c3179b7e9f31ac4b25f (master)
commit 7d19b2bb7b4a4976bc720d72227ee79c440e06fc (release/2.4)
Author: Santtu Lakkala
Date: Mon Oct 21 14:35:06 2019 +0300
Fix OpenSSL private key passphrase notices
Signed-off-by: Santtu Lakkala <santtu.lakkala@jolla.com>
Acked-by: Steffan Karger <steffan.karger@fox-it.com>
Message-Id: <20191021113506.30377-1-santtu.lakkala@jolla.com>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg18953.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
--
kind regards,
Gert Doering
diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c b/src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c index 07916c3c..74c8fa65 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c +++ b/src/openvpn/ssl_openssl.c @@ -921,6 +921,10 @@ end: crypto_msg(M_FATAL, "Cannot load certificate file %s", cert_file); } } + else + { + crypto_print_openssl_errors(M_DEBUG); + } if (in != NULL) { @@ -963,12 +967,7 @@ tls_ctx_load_priv_file(struct tls_root_ctx *ctx, const char *priv_key_file, pkey = PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey(in, NULL, SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb(ctx->ctx), SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb_userdata(ctx->ctx)); - if (!pkey) - { - goto end; - } - - if (!SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ssl_ctx, pkey)) + if (!pkey || !SSL_CTX_use_PrivateKey(ssl_ctx, pkey)) { #ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT if (management && (ERR_GET_REASON(ERR_peek_error()) == EVP_R_BAD_DECRYPT))