Patch V2: Fix function name spelling, cleanup goto code in the new
handle_data_channel_packet function
Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe <arne@rfc2549.org>
---
src/openvpn/ssl.c | 784 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
1 file changed, 403 insertions(+), 381 deletions(-)
@@ -3142,6 +3142,95 @@ nohard:
* to implement a multiplexed TLS channel over the TCP/UDP port.
*/
+static inline void
+handle_data_channel_packet(struct tls_multi *multi,
+ const struct link_socket_actual *from,
+ struct buffer *buf,
+ struct crypto_options **opt,
+ bool floated,
+ const uint8_t **ad_start)
+{
+ struct gc_arena gc = gc_new();
+
+ uint8_t c = *BPTR(buf);
+ int op = c >> P_OPCODE_SHIFT;
+ int key_id = c & P_KEY_ID_MASK;
+
+ /* data channel packet */
+ for (int i = 0; i < KEY_SCAN_SIZE; ++i)
+ {
+ struct key_state *ks = multi->key_scan[i];
+
+ /*
+ * This is the basic test of TLS state compatibility between a local OpenVPN
+ * instance and its remote peer.
+ *
+ * If the test fails, it tells us that we are getting a packet from a source
+ * which claims reference to a prior negotiated TLS session, but the local
+ * OpenVPN instance has no memory of such a negotiation.
+ *
+ * It almost always occurs on UDP sessions when the passive side of the
+ * connection is restarted without the active side restarting as well (the
+ * passive side is the server which only listens for the connections, the
+ * active side is the client which initiates connections).
+ */
+ if (DECRYPT_KEY_ENABLED(multi, ks)
+ && key_id == ks->key_id
+ && (ks->authenticated == KS_AUTH_TRUE)
+ && (floated || link_socket_actual_match(from, &ks->remote_addr)))
+ {
+ if (!ks->crypto_options.key_ctx_bi.initialized)
+ {
+ msg(D_MULTI_DROPPED,
+ "Key %s [%d] not initialized (yet), dropping packet.",
+ print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc), key_id);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* return appropriate data channel decrypt key in opt */
+ *opt = &ks->crypto_options;
+ if (op == P_DATA_V2)
+ {
+ *ad_start = BPTR(buf);
+ }
+ ASSERT(buf_advance(buf, 1));
+ if (op == P_DATA_V1)
+ {
+ *ad_start = BPTR(buf);
+ }
+ else if (op == P_DATA_V2)
+ {
+ if (buf->len < 4)
+ {
+ msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "Protocol error: received P_DATA_V2 from %s but length is < 4",
+ print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc));
+ ++multi->n_soft_errors;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ ASSERT(buf_advance(buf, 3));
+ }
+
+ ++ks->n_packets;
+ ks->n_bytes += buf->len;
+ dmsg(D_TLS_KEYSELECT,
+ "TLS: tls_pre_decrypt, key_id=%d, IP=%s",
+ key_id, print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc));
+ gc_free(&gc);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+
+ msg(D_TLS_ERRORS,
+ "TLS Error: local/remote TLS keys are out of sync: %s [%d]",
+ print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc), key_id);
+
+done:
+ tls_clear_error();
+ buf->len = 0;
+ *opt = NULL;
+ gc_free(&gc);
+}
+
/*
*
* When we are in TLS mode, this is the first routine which sees
@@ -3175,440 +3264,374 @@ tls_pre_decrypt(struct tls_multi *multi,
bool floated,
const uint8_t **ad_start)
{
+
+ if (buf->len <= 0)
+ {
+ buf->len = 0;
+ *opt = NULL;
+ return false;
+ }
+
struct gc_arena gc = gc_new();
bool ret = false;
- if (buf->len > 0)
+ /* get opcode */
+ uint8_t pkt_firstbyte = *BPTR(buf);
+ int op = pkt_firstbyte >> P_OPCODE_SHIFT;
+
+ if ((op == P_DATA_V1) || (op == P_DATA_V2))
{
- int i;
- int op;
- int key_id;
+ handle_data_channel_packet(multi, from, buf, opt, floated, ad_start);
+ return false;
+ }
- /* get opcode and key ID */
+ /* get key_id */
+ int key_id = pkt_firstbyte & P_KEY_ID_MASK;
+
+ /* control channel packet */
+ bool do_burst = false;
+ bool new_link = false;
+ struct session_id sid; /* remote session ID */
+
+ /* verify legal opcode */
+ if (op < P_FIRST_OPCODE || op > P_LAST_OPCODE)
+ {
+ if (op == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V1
+ || op == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V1)
{
- uint8_t c = *BPTR(buf);
- op = c >> P_OPCODE_SHIFT;
- key_id = c & P_KEY_ID_MASK;
+ msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "Peer tried unsupported key-method 1");
}
+ msg(D_TLS_ERRORS,
+ "TLS Error: unknown opcode received from %s op=%d",
+ print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc), op);
+ goto error;
+ }
- if ((op == P_DATA_V1) || (op == P_DATA_V2))
+ /* hard reset ? */
+ if (is_hard_reset_method2(op))
+ {
+ /* verify client -> server or server -> client connection */
+ if (((op == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2
+ || op == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V3) && !multi->opt.server)
+ || ((op == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2) && multi->opt.server))
{
- /* data channel packet */
- for (i = 0; i < KEY_SCAN_SIZE; ++i)
- {
- struct key_state *ks = multi->key_scan[i];
-
- /*
- * This is the basic test of TLS state compatibility between a local OpenVPN
- * instance and its remote peer.
- *
- * If the test fails, it tells us that we are getting a packet from a source
- * which claims reference to a prior negotiated TLS session, but the local
- * OpenVPN instance has no memory of such a negotiation.
- *
- * It almost always occurs on UDP sessions when the passive side of the
- * connection is restarted without the active side restarting as well (the
- * passive side is the server which only listens for the connections, the
- * active side is the client which initiates connections).
- */
- if (DECRYPT_KEY_ENABLED(multi, ks)
- && key_id == ks->key_id
- && (ks->authenticated == KS_AUTH_TRUE)
- && (floated || link_socket_actual_match(from, &ks->remote_addr)))
- {
- if (!ks->crypto_options.key_ctx_bi.initialized)
- {
- msg(D_MULTI_DROPPED,
- "Key %s [%d] not initialized (yet), dropping packet.",
- print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc), key_id);
- goto error_lite;
- }
-
- /* return appropriate data channel decrypt key in opt */
- *opt = &ks->crypto_options;
- if (op == P_DATA_V2)
- {
- *ad_start = BPTR(buf);
- }
- ASSERT(buf_advance(buf, 1));
- if (op == P_DATA_V1)
- {
- *ad_start = BPTR(buf);
- }
- else if (op == P_DATA_V2)
- {
- if (buf->len < 4)
- {
- msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "Protocol error: received P_DATA_V2 from %s but length is < 4",
- print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc));
- goto error;
- }
- ASSERT(buf_advance(buf, 3));
- }
+ msg(D_TLS_ERRORS,
+ "TLS Error: client->client or server->server connection attempted from %s",
+ print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc));
+ goto error;
+ }
+ }
- ++ks->n_packets;
- ks->n_bytes += buf->len;
- dmsg(D_TLS_KEYSELECT,
- "TLS: tls_pre_decrypt, key_id=%d, IP=%s",
- key_id, print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc));
- gc_free(&gc);
- return ret;
- }
- }
+ /*
+ * Authenticate Packet
+ */
+ dmsg(D_TLS_DEBUG, "TLS: control channel, op=%s, IP=%s",
+ packet_opcode_name(op), print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc));
+ /* get remote session-id */
+ {
+ struct buffer tmp = *buf;
+ buf_advance(&tmp, 1);
+ if (!session_id_read(&sid, &tmp) || !session_id_defined(&sid))
+ {
msg(D_TLS_ERRORS,
- "TLS Error: local/remote TLS keys are out of sync: %s [%d]",
- print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc), key_id);
- goto error_lite;
+ "TLS Error: session-id not found in packet from %s",
+ print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc));
+ goto error;
}
- else /* control channel packet */
- {
- bool do_burst = false;
- bool new_link = false;
- struct session_id sid; /* remote session ID */
+ }
+
+ int i;
+ /* use session ID to match up packet with appropriate tls_session object */
+ for (i = 0; i < TM_SIZE; ++i)
+ {
+ struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[i];
+ struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY];
- /* verify legal opcode */
- if (op < P_FIRST_OPCODE || op > P_LAST_OPCODE)
+ dmsg(D_TLS_DEBUG,
+ "TLS: initial packet test, i=%d state=%s, mysid=%s, rec-sid=%s, rec-ip=%s, stored-sid=%s, stored-ip=%s",
+ i,
+ state_name(ks->state),
+ session_id_print(&session->session_id, &gc),
+ session_id_print(&sid, &gc),
+ print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc),
+ session_id_print(&ks->session_id_remote, &gc),
+ print_link_socket_actual(&ks->remote_addr, &gc));
+
+ if (session_id_equal(&ks->session_id_remote, &sid))
+ /* found a match */
+ {
+ if (i == TM_LAME_DUCK)
{
- if (op == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V1
- || op == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V1)
- {
- msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "Peer tried unsupported key-method 1");
- }
msg(D_TLS_ERRORS,
- "TLS Error: unknown opcode received from %s op=%d",
- print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc), op);
+ "TLS ERROR: received control packet with stale session-id=%s",
+ session_id_print(&sid, &gc));
goto error;
}
+ dmsg(D_TLS_DEBUG,
+ "TLS: found match, session[%d], sid=%s",
+ i, session_id_print(&sid, &gc));
+ break;
+ }
+ }
- /* hard reset ? */
- if (is_hard_reset_method2(op))
- {
- /* verify client -> server or server -> client connection */
- if (((op == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V2
- || op == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_CLIENT_V3) && !multi->opt.server)
- || ((op == P_CONTROL_HARD_RESET_SERVER_V2) && multi->opt.server))
- {
- msg(D_TLS_ERRORS,
- "TLS Error: client->client or server->server connection attempted from %s",
- print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc));
- goto error;
- }
- }
-
- /*
- * Authenticate Packet
- */
- dmsg(D_TLS_DEBUG, "TLS: control channel, op=%s, IP=%s",
- packet_opcode_name(op), print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc));
+ /*
+ * Hard reset and session id does not match any session in
+ * multi->session: Possible initial packet
+ */
+ if (i == TM_SIZE && is_hard_reset_method2(op))
+ {
+ struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[TM_ACTIVE];
+ struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY];
- /* get remote session-id */
+ /*
+ * If we have no session currently in progress, the initial packet will
+ * open a new session in TM_ACTIVE rather than TM_UNTRUSTED.
+ */
+ if (!session_id_defined(&ks->session_id_remote))
+ {
+ if (multi->opt.single_session && multi->n_sessions)
{
- struct buffer tmp = *buf;
- buf_advance(&tmp, 1);
- if (!session_id_read(&sid, &tmp) || !session_id_defined(&sid))
- {
- msg(D_TLS_ERRORS,
- "TLS Error: session-id not found in packet from %s",
- print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc));
- goto error;
- }
+ msg(D_TLS_ERRORS,
+ "TLS Error: Cannot accept new session request from %s due to session context expire or --single-session [1]",
+ print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc));
+ goto error;
}
- /* use session ID to match up packet with appropriate tls_session object */
- for (i = 0; i < TM_SIZE; ++i)
+#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT
+ if (management)
{
- struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[i];
- struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY];
-
- dmsg(D_TLS_DEBUG,
- "TLS: initial packet test, i=%d state=%s, mysid=%s, rec-sid=%s, rec-ip=%s, stored-sid=%s, stored-ip=%s",
- i,
- state_name(ks->state),
- session_id_print(&session->session_id, &gc),
- session_id_print(&sid, &gc),
- print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc),
- session_id_print(&ks->session_id_remote, &gc),
- print_link_socket_actual(&ks->remote_addr, &gc));
-
- if (session_id_equal(&ks->session_id_remote, &sid))
- /* found a match */
- {
- if (i == TM_LAME_DUCK)
- {
- msg(D_TLS_ERRORS,
- "TLS ERROR: received control packet with stale session-id=%s",
- session_id_print(&sid, &gc));
- goto error;
- }
- dmsg(D_TLS_DEBUG,
- "TLS: found match, session[%d], sid=%s",
- i, session_id_print(&sid, &gc));
- break;
- }
+ management_set_state(management,
+ OPENVPN_STATE_AUTH,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL,
+ NULL);
}
+#endif
- /*
- * Hard reset and session id does not match any session in
- * multi->session: Possible initial packet
- */
- if (i == TM_SIZE && is_hard_reset_method2(op))
- {
- struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[TM_ACTIVE];
- struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY];
-
- /*
- * If we have no session currently in progress, the initial packet will
- * open a new session in TM_ACTIVE rather than TM_UNTRUSTED.
- */
- if (!session_id_defined(&ks->session_id_remote))
- {
- if (multi->opt.single_session && multi->n_sessions)
- {
- msg(D_TLS_ERRORS,
- "TLS Error: Cannot accept new session request from %s due to session context expire or --single-session [1]",
- print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc));
- goto error;
- }
+ msg(D_TLS_DEBUG_LOW,
+ "TLS: Initial packet from %s, sid=%s",
+ print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc),
+ session_id_print(&sid, &gc));
-#ifdef ENABLE_MANAGEMENT
- if (management)
- {
- management_set_state(management,
- OPENVPN_STATE_AUTH,
- NULL,
- NULL,
- NULL,
- NULL,
- NULL);
- }
-#endif
+ do_burst = true;
+ new_link = true;
+ i = TM_ACTIVE;
+ session->untrusted_addr = *from;
+ }
+ }
- msg(D_TLS_DEBUG_LOW,
- "TLS: Initial packet from %s, sid=%s",
- print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc),
- session_id_print(&sid, &gc));
+ /*
+ * If we detected new session in the last if block, i has
+ * changed to TM_ACTIVE, so check the condition again.
+ */
+ if (i == TM_SIZE && is_hard_reset_method2(op))
+ {
+ /*
+ * No match with existing sessions,
+ * probably a new session.
+ */
+ struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[TM_UNTRUSTED];
- do_burst = true;
- new_link = true;
- i = TM_ACTIVE;
- session->untrusted_addr = *from;
- }
- }
+ /*
+ * If --single-session, don't allow any hard-reset connection request
+ * unless it the the first packet of the session.
+ */
+ if (multi->opt.single_session)
+ {
+ msg(D_TLS_ERRORS,
+ "TLS Error: Cannot accept new session request from %s due to session context expire or --single-session [2]",
+ print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc));
+ goto error;
+ }
- /*
- * If we detected new session in the last if block, i has
- * changed to TM_ACTIVE, so check the condition again.
- */
- if (i == TM_SIZE && is_hard_reset_method2(op))
- {
- /*
- * No match with existing sessions,
- * probably a new session.
- */
- struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[TM_UNTRUSTED];
-
- /*
- * If --single-session, don't allow any hard-reset connection request
- * unless it the the first packet of the session.
- */
- if (multi->opt.single_session)
- {
- msg(D_TLS_ERRORS,
- "TLS Error: Cannot accept new session request from %s due to session context expire or --single-session [2]",
- print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc));
- goto error;
- }
+ if (!read_control_auth(buf, &session->tls_wrap, from,
+ session->opt))
+ {
+ goto error;
+ }
- if (!read_control_auth(buf, &session->tls_wrap, from,
- session->opt))
- {
- goto error;
- }
+ /*
+ * New session-initiating control packet is authenticated at this point,
+ * assuming that the --tls-auth command line option was used.
+ *
+ * Without --tls-auth, we leave authentication entirely up to TLS.
+ */
+ msg(D_TLS_DEBUG_LOW,
+ "TLS: new session incoming connection from %s",
+ print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc));
- /*
- * New session-initiating control packet is authenticated at this point,
- * assuming that the --tls-auth command line option was used.
- *
- * Without --tls-auth, we leave authentication entirely up to TLS.
- */
- msg(D_TLS_DEBUG_LOW,
- "TLS: new session incoming connection from %s",
- print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc));
+ new_link = true;
+ i = TM_UNTRUSTED;
+ session->untrusted_addr = *from;
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[i];
+ struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY];
- new_link = true;
- i = TM_UNTRUSTED;
- session->untrusted_addr = *from;
- }
- else
+ /*
+ * Packet must belong to an existing session.
+ */
+ if (i != TM_ACTIVE && i != TM_UNTRUSTED)
+ {
+ msg(D_TLS_ERRORS,
+ "TLS Error: Unroutable control packet received from %s (si=%d op=%s)",
+ print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc),
+ i,
+ packet_opcode_name(op));
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Verify remote IP address
+ */
+ if (!new_link && !link_socket_actual_match(&ks->remote_addr, from))
+ {
+ msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Error: Received control packet from unexpected IP addr: %s",
+ print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc));
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Remote is requesting a key renegotiation
+ */
+ if (op == P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1
+ && DECRYPT_KEY_ENABLED(multi, ks))
+ {
+ if (!read_control_auth(buf, &session->tls_wrap, from,
+ session->opt))
{
- struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[i];
- struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY];
+ goto error;
+ }
- /*
- * Packet must belong to an existing session.
- */
- if (i != TM_ACTIVE && i != TM_UNTRUSTED)
- {
- msg(D_TLS_ERRORS,
- "TLS Error: Unroutable control packet received from %s (si=%d op=%s)",
- print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc),
- i,
- packet_opcode_name(op));
- goto error;
- }
+ key_state_soft_reset(session);
- /*
- * Verify remote IP address
- */
- if (!new_link && !link_socket_actual_match(&ks->remote_addr, from))
- {
- msg(D_TLS_ERRORS, "TLS Error: Received control packet from unexpected IP addr: %s",
- print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc));
- goto error;
- }
+ dmsg(D_TLS_DEBUG,
+ "TLS: received P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1 s=%d sid=%s",
+ i, session_id_print(&sid, &gc));
+ }
+ else
+ {
+ /*
+ * Remote responding to our key renegotiation request?
+ */
+ if (op == P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1)
+ {
+ do_burst = true;
+ }
- /*
- * Remote is requesting a key renegotiation
- */
- if (op == P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1
- && DECRYPT_KEY_ENABLED(multi, ks))
- {
- if (!read_control_auth(buf, &session->tls_wrap, from,
- session->opt))
- {
- goto error;
- }
+ if (!read_control_auth(buf, &session->tls_wrap, from,
+ session->opt))
+ {
+ goto error;
+ }
- key_state_soft_reset(session);
+ dmsg(D_TLS_DEBUG,
+ "TLS: received control channel packet s#=%d sid=%s",
+ i, session_id_print(&sid, &gc));
+ }
+ }
- dmsg(D_TLS_DEBUG,
- "TLS: received P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1 s=%d sid=%s",
- i, session_id_print(&sid, &gc));
- }
- else
- {
- /*
- * Remote responding to our key renegotiation request?
- */
- if (op == P_CONTROL_SOFT_RESET_V1)
- {
- do_burst = true;
- }
+ /*
+ * We have an authenticated control channel packet (if --tls-auth was set).
+ * Now pass to our reliability layer which deals with
+ * packet acknowledgements, retransmits, sequencing, etc.
+ */
+ struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[i];
+ struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY];
- if (!read_control_auth(buf, &session->tls_wrap, from,
- session->opt))
- {
- goto error;
- }
+ /* Make sure we were initialized and that we're not in an error state */
+ ASSERT(ks->state != S_UNDEF);
+ ASSERT(ks->state != S_ERROR);
+ ASSERT(session_id_defined(&session->session_id));
- dmsg(D_TLS_DEBUG,
- "TLS: received control channel packet s#=%d sid=%s",
- i, session_id_print(&sid, &gc));
- }
- }
+ /* Let our caller know we processed a control channel packet */
+ ret = true;
- /*
- * We have an authenticated control channel packet (if --tls-auth was set).
- * Now pass to our reliability layer which deals with
- * packet acknowledgements, retransmits, sequencing, etc.
- */
- {
- struct tls_session *session = &multi->session[i];
- struct key_state *ks = &session->key[KS_PRIMARY];
+ /*
+ * Set our remote address and remote session_id
+ */
+ if (new_link)
+ {
+ ks->session_id_remote = sid;
+ ks->remote_addr = *from;
+ ++multi->n_sessions;
+ }
+ else if (!link_socket_actual_match(&ks->remote_addr, from))
+ {
+ msg(D_TLS_ERRORS,
+ "TLS Error: Existing session control channel packet from unknown IP address: %s",
+ print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc));
+ goto error;
+ }
- /* Make sure we were initialized and that we're not in an error state */
- ASSERT(ks->state != S_UNDEF);
- ASSERT(ks->state != S_ERROR);
- ASSERT(session_id_defined(&session->session_id));
+ /*
+ * Should we do a retransmit of all unacknowledged packets in
+ * the send buffer? This improves the start-up efficiency of the
+ * initial key negotiation after the 2nd peer comes online.
+ */
+ if (do_burst && !session->burst)
+ {
+ reliable_schedule_now(ks->send_reliable);
+ session->burst = true;
+ }
- /* Let our caller know we processed a control channel packet */
- ret = true;
+ /* Check key_id */
+ if (ks->key_id != key_id)
+ {
+ msg(D_TLS_ERRORS,
+ "TLS ERROR: local/remote key IDs out of sync (%d/%d) ID: %s",
+ ks->key_id, key_id, print_key_id(multi, &gc));
+ goto error;
+ }
- /*
- * Set our remote address and remote session_id
- */
- if (new_link)
- {
- ks->session_id_remote = sid;
- ks->remote_addr = *from;
- ++multi->n_sessions;
- }
- else if (!link_socket_actual_match(&ks->remote_addr, from))
- {
- msg(D_TLS_ERRORS,
- "TLS Error: Existing session control channel packet from unknown IP address: %s",
- print_link_socket_actual(from, &gc));
- goto error;
- }
+ /*
+ * Process incoming ACKs for packets we can now
+ * delete from reliable send buffer
+ */
+ {
+ /* buffers all packet IDs to delete from send_reliable */
+ struct reliable_ack send_ack;
- /*
- * Should we do a retransmit of all unacknowledged packets in
- * the send buffer? This improves the start-up efficiency of the
- * initial key negotiation after the 2nd peer comes online.
- */
- if (do_burst && !session->burst)
- {
- reliable_schedule_now(ks->send_reliable);
- session->burst = true;
- }
+ send_ack.len = 0;
+ if (!reliable_ack_read(&send_ack, buf, &session->session_id))
+ {
+ msg(D_TLS_ERRORS,
+ "TLS Error: reading acknowledgement record from packet");
+ goto error;
+ }
+ reliable_send_purge(ks->send_reliable, &send_ack);
+ }
- /* Check key_id */
- if (ks->key_id != key_id)
- {
- msg(D_TLS_ERRORS,
- "TLS ERROR: local/remote key IDs out of sync (%d/%d) ID: %s",
- ks->key_id, key_id, print_key_id(multi, &gc));
- goto error;
- }
+ if (op != P_ACK_V1 && reliable_can_get(ks->rec_reliable))
+ {
+ packet_id_type id;
- /*
- * Process incoming ACKs for packets we can now
- * delete from reliable send buffer
- */
+ /* Extract the packet ID from the packet */
+ if (reliable_ack_read_packet_id(buf, &id))
+ {
+ /* Avoid deadlock by rejecting packet that would de-sequentialize receive buffer */
+ if (reliable_wont_break_sequentiality(ks->rec_reliable, id))
+ {
+ if (reliable_not_replay(ks->rec_reliable, id))
{
- /* buffers all packet IDs to delete from send_reliable */
- struct reliable_ack send_ack;
-
- send_ack.len = 0;
- if (!reliable_ack_read(&send_ack, buf, &session->session_id))
+ /* Save incoming ciphertext packet to reliable buffer */
+ struct buffer *in = reliable_get_buf(ks->rec_reliable);
+ ASSERT(in);
+ if (!buf_copy(in, buf))
{
- msg(D_TLS_ERRORS,
- "TLS Error: reading acknowledgement record from packet");
+ msg(D_MULTI_DROPPED,
+ "Incoming control channel packet too big, dropping.");
goto error;
}
- reliable_send_purge(ks->send_reliable, &send_ack);
+ reliable_mark_active_incoming(ks->rec_reliable, in, id, op);
}
- if (op != P_ACK_V1 && reliable_can_get(ks->rec_reliable))
- {
- packet_id_type id;
-
- /* Extract the packet ID from the packet */
- if (reliable_ack_read_packet_id(buf, &id))
- {
- /* Avoid deadlock by rejecting packet that would de-sequentialize receive buffer */
- if (reliable_wont_break_sequentiality(ks->rec_reliable, id))
- {
- if (reliable_not_replay(ks->rec_reliable, id))
- {
- /* Save incoming ciphertext packet to reliable buffer */
- struct buffer *in = reliable_get_buf(ks->rec_reliable);
- ASSERT(in);
- if (!buf_copy(in, buf))
- {
- msg(D_MULTI_DROPPED,
- "Incoming control channel packet too big, dropping.");
- goto error;
- }
- reliable_mark_active_incoming(ks->rec_reliable, in, id, op);
- }
-
- /* Process outgoing acknowledgment for packet just received, even if it's a replay */
- reliable_ack_acknowledge_packet_id(ks->rec_ack, id);
- }
- }
- }
+ /* Process outgoing acknowledgment for packet just received, even if it's a replay */
+ reliable_ack_acknowledge_packet_id(ks->rec_ack, id);
}
}
}
@@ -3621,7 +3644,6 @@ done:
error:
++multi->n_soft_errors;
-error_lite:
tls_clear_error();
goto done;
}
- Extract data packet handling to its own function - Replace two instances of if (x) { code } with if (!x) return; code - Remove extra curly braces that were used for pre C99 code style to be able to declare variables in the middle of a block This patch is easier to review with "ignore white space" as the