[Openvpn-devel,v3] Allow 'none' cipher being specified in --data-ciphers
Commit Message
Although we want to get rid of none as cipher, we still have not
deprecated it. In order to use it currently you need
--ncp-disable together with --cipher none to use the none cipher
otherwise OpenVPN will spit out an error about an unrecognised
cipher in --data-ciphers.
In our current situation allowing none to be specified in data-ciphers
is the lesser evil.
This commit also fixes that we use '[null-cipher]' instead 'none' when
setting remote_cipher.
Note that negotiating to cipher 'none' can the same the same problems
with frame size calculation as any other non AEAD cipher. If
--cipher none is also specified in the configuration, the workaround
of commit e539c95dc will also apply to cipher none.
Patch V2: Also work correctly if remote_cipher is NULL.
Patch V3: fix unit tests, add note about corner case
Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe <arne@rfc2549.org>
---
src/openvpn/ssl.c | 8 ++++++++
src/openvpn/ssl_ncp.c | 16 +++++++++++++++-
tests/unit_tests/openvpn/test_ncp.c | 14 ++++++++++++--
3 files changed, 35 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
Comments
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
I have added two new cases to my server test suite: client with
"--data-ciphers none" and "--ncp-disable --cipher none", against
a server instance that permits "none" as part of its data-ciphers.
The first case failed on the client side ("unrecognized
cipher: none"), the second case was refused by the server side
("No common cipher... client supports cipher '[null-cipher]').
Of course the server side *also* needs the patch to accept
"none" as part of --data-ciphers :-)
Then, this works:
2020-10-04 15:04:28 us=208824 2001:608:4:0:669a:56c1:4175:2c5b peer info: IV_CIPHERS=none
2020-10-04 15:04:28 us=251968 Data Channel: using negotiated cipher 'none'
2020-10-04 15:04:28 us=252006 ******* WARNING *******: '--cipher none' was ...
The warning in the logs is very clear and explicit - and I think
this is good. This is a very special-use setting, and should
only be used with sufficient information and consideration.
Big IPv4 packets (t_client test with 3000 bytes) do not work - something
is wrong in our mtu/overhead calcululation. But this is not something
new (as the v3 commit message rightly points out) - if I do "client
connects with --data-cipher DES-EDE3-CBC" (non AEAD) I get the same
TCP/UDP packet too large on write to ... (tried=1544,max=1542)
error as I have with "none" (there, it is tried=1529,max=1526). Strange
enough this only happens for IPv4 packets.
Your patch has been applied to the master and release/2.5 branch.
commit c018fc00be25aee5921d234531f87753a3a7aec7 (master)
commit f308251acdc539acb370aeccf46b0ec5587129c1 (release/2.5)
Author: Arne Schwabe
Date: Thu Oct 8 13:59:59 2020 +0200
Allow 'none' cipher being specified in --data-ciphers
Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe <arne@rfc2549.org>
Acked-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
Message-Id: <20201008115959.21151-1-arne@rfc2549.org>
URL: https://www.mail-archive.com/openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net/msg21181.html
Signed-off-by: Gert Doering <gert@greenie.muc.de>
--
kind regards,
Gert Doering
@@ -2554,6 +2554,14 @@ key_method_2_read(struct buffer *buf, struct tls_multi *multi, struct tls_sessio
multi->remote_ciphername =
options_string_extract_option(options, "cipher", NULL);
+ /* In OCC we send '[null-cipher]' instead 'none' */
+ if (multi->remote_ciphername
+ && strcmp(multi->remote_ciphername, "[null-cipher]") == 0)
+ {
+ free(multi->remote_ciphername);
+ multi->remote_ciphername = string_alloc("none", NULL);
+ }
+
if (tls_session_user_pass_enabled(session))
{
/* Perform username/password authentication */
@@ -110,7 +110,15 @@ mutate_ncp_cipher_list(const char *list, struct gc_arena *gc)
* e.g. replacing AeS-128-gCm with AES-128-GCM
*/
const cipher_kt_t *ktc = cipher_kt_get(token);
- if (!ktc)
+ if (strcmp(token, "none") == 0)
+ {
+ msg(M_WARN, "WARNING: cipher 'none' specified for --data-ciphers. "
+ "This allows negotiation of NO encryption and "
+ "tunnelled data WILL then be transmitted in clear text "
+ "over the network! "
+ "PLEASE DO RECONSIDER THIS SETTING!");
+ }
+ if (!ktc && strcmp(token, "none")!= 0)
{
msg(M_WARN, "Unsupported cipher in --data-ciphers: %s", token);
error_found = true;
@@ -118,6 +126,12 @@ mutate_ncp_cipher_list(const char *list, struct gc_arena *gc)
else
{
const char *ovpn_cipher_name = cipher_kt_name(ktc);
+ if (ktc == NULL)
+ {
+ /* NULL resolves to [null-cipher] but we need none for
+ * data-ciphers */
+ ovpn_cipher_name = "none";
+ }
if (buf_len(&new_list)> 0)
{
@@ -50,7 +50,9 @@ test_check_ncp_ciphers_list(void **state)
struct gc_arena gc = gc_new();
bool have_chacha = cipher_kt_get("CHACHA20-POLY1305");
-
+ assert_string_equal(mutate_ncp_cipher_list("none", &gc), "none");
+ assert_string_equal(mutate_ncp_cipher_list("AES-256-GCM:none", &gc),
+ "AES-256-GCM:none");
assert_string_equal(mutate_ncp_cipher_list(aes_ciphers, &gc), aes_ciphers);
@@ -139,7 +141,7 @@ test_poor_man(void **state)
char *best_cipher;
const char *serverlist = "CHACHA20_POLY1305:AES-128-GCM";
- const char *serverlistbfcbc = "CHACHA20_POLY1305:AES-128-GCM:BF-CBC";
+ const char *serverlistbfcbc = "CHACHA20_POLY1305:AES-128-GCM:BF-CBC:none";
best_cipher = ncp_get_best_cipher(serverlist,
"IV_YOLO=NO\nIV_BAR=7",
@@ -166,6 +168,14 @@ test_poor_man(void **state)
assert_string_equal(best_cipher, "AES-128-GCM");
+ best_cipher = ncp_get_best_cipher(serverlist, NULL,
+ "none", &gc);
+ assert_ptr_equal(best_cipher, NULL);
+
+ best_cipher = ncp_get_best_cipher(serverlistbfcbc, NULL,
+ "none", &gc);
+ assert_string_equal(best_cipher, "none");
+
best_cipher = ncp_get_best_cipher(serverlist, NULL,NULL, &gc);
assert_ptr_equal(best_cipher, NULL);