[Openvpn-devel] ovpn-dco: hold peer ref in ovpn_tcp_read_sock under RCU
Commit Message
ovpn_tcp_read_sock() uses sock->peer without taking a reference.
ovpn_peer_del() can drop the last hash-table reference while the
TCP data_ready callback is still attached, so peer->refcount may
already be zero when ovpn_peer_hold() is later called for
ovpn_recv(). That leads to a WARN_ON and a refcount underflow when
the async path puts the peer.
Take the peer reference under rcu_read_lock() before leaving the
RCU critical section, and drop it on all exit paths. If the peer
is already being destroyed, stop consuming the stream quietly.
Fixes: 209247cf6d47 ("ovpn-dco: implement TCP transport support")
Signed-off-by: liuchong <979504756@qq.com>
---
drivers/net/ovpn-dco/tcp.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
Comments
Hi,
Thanks for the patch.
On Wed, 18 Nov 2026 15:00:37 +0800, liuchong via Openvpn-devel <openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net> wrote:
> ovpn_tcp_read_sock() uses sock->peer without taking a reference.
> ovpn_peer_del() can drop the last hash-table reference while the
> TCP data_ready callback is still attached, so peer->refcount may
> already be zero when ovpn_peer_hold() is later called for
> ovpn_recv(). That leads to a WARN_ON and a refcount underflow when
> the async path puts the peer.
>
> Take the peer reference under rcu_read_lock() before leaving the
> RCU critical section, and drop it on all exit paths. If the peer
> is already being destroyed, stop consuming the stream quietly.
>
> Fixes: 209247cf6d47 ("ovpn-dco: implement TCP transport support")
> Signed-off-by: liuchong <979504756@qq.com>
I'm not sure this SoB tag is fully compliant with the Developer
Certificate of Origin. If you can, please use your real name, as the DCO
asks for a known identity.
> ---
> drivers/net/ovpn-dco/tcp.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++------
> 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/drivers/net/ovpn-dco/tcp.c b/drivers/net/ovpn-dco/tcp.c
> index fe095f9..d8f9afd 100644
> --- a/drivers/net/ovpn-dco/tcp.c
> +++ b/drivers/net/ovpn-dco/tcp.c
> @@ -35,15 +35,26 @@ static int ovpn_tcp_read_sock(read_descriptor_t *desc, struct sk_buff *in_skb,
>
> rcu_read_lock();
> sock = rcu_dereference_sk_user_data(sk);
> - rcu_read_unlock();
> -
> if (unlikely(!sock || !sock->peer)) {
> + rcu_read_unlock();
> pr_err("ovpn: read_sock triggered for socket with no metadata\n");
> desc->error = -EINVAL;
> return 0;
> }
>
> + /* Take a reference while still under RCU: ovpn_peer_del() may drop the
> + * last hash-table reference before socket callbacks are restored in
> + * ovpn_peer_release(). Without this hold, a concurrent delete leaves
> + * peer->refcount at 0 while this callback still runs, causing
> + * ovpn_peer_hold() for ovpn_recv() to fail and a later put to underflow.
> + */
The new comment is quite long for what it says, and the commit message
already carries the same explanation.
Something like
/* hold the peer while still under RCU, it may be getting deleted */
would be enough.
Aside from these two minor nits, neither of which needs a respin on its
own account, the code LGTM.
Reviewed-by: Ralf Lici <ralf@mandelbit.com>
Regards,
@@ -35,15 +35,26 @@ static int ovpn_tcp_read_sock(read_descriptor_t *desc, struct sk_buff *in_skb,
rcu_read_lock();
sock = rcu_dereference_sk_user_data(sk);
- rcu_read_unlock();
-
if (unlikely(!sock || !sock->peer)) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
pr_err("ovpn: read_sock triggered for socket with no metadata\n");
desc->error = -EINVAL;
return 0;
}
+ /* Take a reference while still under RCU: ovpn_peer_del() may drop the
+ * last hash-table reference before socket callbacks are restored in
+ * ovpn_peer_release(). Without this hold, a concurrent delete leaves
+ * peer->refcount at 0 while this callback still runs, causing
+ * ovpn_peer_hold() for ovpn_recv() to fail and a later put to underflow.
+ */
peer = sock->peer;
+ if (unlikely(!ovpn_peer_hold(peer))) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ /* Peer is already being destroyed; stop consuming the stream. */
+ return 0;
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
while (in_len > 0) {
/* no skb allocated means that we have to read (or finish reading) the 2 bytes
@@ -103,11 +114,10 @@ static int ovpn_tcp_read_sock(read_descriptor_t *desc, struct sk_buff *in_skb,
* Queue skb for sending to userspace via recvmsg on the socket
*/
if (likely(ovpn_opcode_from_skb(peer->tcp.skb, 0) == OVPN_DATA_V2)) {
- /* hold reference to peer as required by ovpn_recv().
+ /* Extra reference required by ovpn_recv() / decrypt_work.
*
- * NOTE: in this context we should already be holding a
- * reference to this peer, therefore ovpn_peer_hold() is
- * not expected to fail
+ * NOTE: this cannot fail as this function already holds a
+ * reference to the peer.
*/
WARN_ON(!ovpn_peer_hold(peer));
status = ovpn_recv(peer->ovpn, peer, peer->tcp.skb);
@@ -140,10 +150,12 @@ next_read:
copied += chunk;
}
+ ovpn_peer_put(peer);
return copied;
err:
netdev_err(peer->ovpn->dev, "cannot process incoming TCP data: %d\n", desc->error);
ovpn_peer_del(peer, OVPN_DEL_PEER_REASON_TRANSPORT_ERROR);
+ ovpn_peer_put(peer);
return 0;
}