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The original message has been attached to this so you can view it or label similar future email. If you have any questions, see the administrator of that system for details. Content preview: Each packet holds its peer across packet processing and asynchronous crypto completion. When traffic for one peer is spread across several CPUs, the shared kref cache line therefore moves between thos [...] Content analysis details: (-0.2 points, 5.0 required) pts rule name description ---- ---------------------- -------------------------------------------------- -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain -0.1 DKIM_VALID_EF Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from envelope-from domain 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid 0.0 RCVD_IN_MSPIKE_H2 RBL: Average reputation (+2) [195.10.208.52 listed in wl.mailspike.net] X-Headers-End: 1x7b4X-0006St-9n Subject: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH ovpn net-next v2 1/2] ovpn: use percpu references for peers X-BeenThere: openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.21 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , Errors-To: openvpn-devel-bounces@lists.sourceforge.net X-getmail-retrieved-from-mailbox: Inbox X-GMAIL-THRID: 1876686243295978375 X-GMAIL-MSGID: 1876686243295978375 Each packet holds its peer across packet processing and asynchronous crypto completion. When traffic for one peer is spread across several CPUs, the shared kref cache line therefore moves between those CPUs for every packet. Replace the peer kref with percpu_ref and kill the initial reference exactly once after the peer has been removed from its lookup structures and detached from its socket. Keep the existing RCU-delayed destruction and release the percpu_ref storage in the final RCU callback. Use an unconditional percpu_ref_get where the caller already owns a peer reference or otherwise excludes teardown. Such callers must remain able to extend their existing ownership while the killed reference drains. RCU-protected lookup paths instead use percpu_ref_tryget_live_rcu, so they stop admitting new users as soon as teardown starts. This deliberately makes stale TCP socket lookups fail earlier than kref_get_unless_zero, which continued succeeding until the count reached zero. percpu_ref_init can fail, so propagate allocation failure from peer creation. This trades a per-CPU counter allocation for a cheaper live data path on these long-lived, heavily shared objects. Specifically, in terms of memory, this costs: 8 bytes per possible CPU for the counters, a 56-byte control object, and 8 additional bytes in struct ovpn_peer. In a 32-stream test using one peer and one key, perf c2c placed the peer kref cacheline second among system-wide shared cachelines, with 37 sampled HITM loads attributed to the locked reference update. After this change that shared reference line was no longer sampled, while the untouched key-slot kref addressed by the next commit remained visible. RX used a single receive queue, so only TX exercised CPU fan-out in this test. Signed-off-by: Ralf Lici --- Changes since v1 https://lore.kernel.org/openvpn-devel/da742f32b00e7a6872062ce36a3dc4add665f189.1789658051.git.ralf@mandelbit.com/ - Use unconditional percpu_ref_get where the caller already owns the peer or otherwise excludes teardown and percpu_ref_tryget_live_rcu for TCP socket lookups under RCU. (Sashiko) - Make the percpu-ref release callback private to peer.c. drivers/net/ovpn/io.c | 6 +----- drivers/net/ovpn/netlink.c | 6 +++--- drivers/net/ovpn/peer.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------------- drivers/net/ovpn/peer.h | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------ drivers/net/ovpn/tcp.c | 23 +++++++++++------------ 5 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 40 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/net/ovpn/io.c b/drivers/net/ovpn/io.c index 9526f8096da6..15072ce960fa 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ovpn/io.c +++ b/drivers/net/ovpn/io.c @@ -321,11 +321,7 @@ static bool ovpn_encrypt_one(struct ovpn_peer *peer, struct sk_buff *skb) /* take a reference to the peer because the crypto code may run async. * ovpn_encrypt_post() will release it upon completion */ - if (unlikely(!ovpn_peer_hold(peer))) { - DEBUG_NET_WARN_ON_ONCE(1); - ovpn_crypto_key_slot_put(ks); - return false; - } + ovpn_peer_hold(peer); memset(ovpn_skb_cb(skb), 0, sizeof(struct ovpn_cb)); ovpn_encrypt_post(skb, ovpn_aead_encrypt(peer, ks, skb)); diff --git a/drivers/net/ovpn/netlink.c b/drivers/net/ovpn/netlink.c index 4dad85294198..8cdf46b61142 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ovpn/netlink.c +++ b/drivers/net/ovpn/netlink.c @@ -463,11 +463,11 @@ int ovpn_nl_peer_new_doit(struct sk_buff *skb, struct genl_info *info) ovpn_socket_release(peer); peer_release: /* For UDP, the peer is unreachable until added to the hashtables, so - * dropping the initial reference is enough. For TCP, the peer may be + * killing the initial reference is enough. For TCP, the peer may be * concurrently reachable via sk_user_data->peer until - * ovpn_socket_release() detaches; rely on the refcount. + * ovpn_socket_release() detaches; rely on the percpu reference. */ - ovpn_peer_put(peer); + ovpn_peer_kill(peer); return ret; } diff --git a/drivers/net/ovpn/peer.c b/drivers/net/ovpn/peer.c index c95656ca7c35..970ca7232ae4 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ovpn/peer.c +++ b/drivers/net/ovpn/peer.c @@ -22,6 +22,8 @@ #include "peer.h" #include "socket.h" +static void ovpn_peer_release_ref(struct percpu_ref *ref); + static void unlock_ovpn(struct ovpn_priv *ovpn, struct llist_head *release_list) __releases(&ovpn->lock) @@ -33,7 +35,7 @@ static void unlock_ovpn(struct ovpn_priv *ovpn, llist_for_each_entry_safe(peer, next, release_list->first, release_entry) { ovpn_socket_release(peer); - ovpn_peer_put(peer); + ovpn_peer_kill(peer); } } @@ -113,7 +115,6 @@ struct ovpn_peer *ovpn_peer_new(struct ovpn_priv *ovpn, u32 id) RCU_INIT_POINTER(peer->bind, NULL); ovpn_crypto_state_init(&peer->crypto); spin_lock_init(&peer->lock); - kref_init(&peer->refcount); ovpn_peer_stats_init(&peer->vpn_stats); ovpn_peer_stats_init(&peer->link_stats); INIT_WORK(&peer->keepalive_work, ovpn_peer_keepalive_send); @@ -127,6 +128,14 @@ struct ovpn_peer *ovpn_peer_new(struct ovpn_priv *ovpn, u32 id) return ERR_PTR(ret); } + ret = percpu_ref_init(&peer->refcount, ovpn_peer_release_ref, 0, + GFP_KERNEL); + if (ret < 0) { + dst_cache_destroy(&peer->dst_cache); + kfree(peer); + return ERR_PTR(ret); + } + netdev_hold(ovpn->dev, &peer->dev_tracker, GFP_KERNEL); return peer; @@ -348,6 +357,7 @@ static void ovpn_peer_release_rcu(struct rcu_head *head) * perform it in the RCU callback, when all contexts are done */ dst_cache_destroy(&peer->dst_cache); + percpu_ref_exit(&peer->refcount); kfree(peer); } @@ -366,12 +376,12 @@ static void ovpn_peer_release(struct ovpn_peer *peer) } /** - * ovpn_peer_release_kref - callback for kref_put - * @kref: the kref object belonging to the peer + * ovpn_peer_release_ref - callback for the peer percpu reference + * @ref: the percpu_ref object belonging to the peer */ -void ovpn_peer_release_kref(struct kref *kref) +static void ovpn_peer_release_ref(struct percpu_ref *ref) { - struct ovpn_peer *peer = container_of(kref, struct ovpn_peer, refcount); + struct ovpn_peer *peer = container_of(ref, struct ovpn_peer, refcount); ovpn_peer_release(peer); } @@ -569,7 +579,7 @@ ovpn_peer_get_by_transp_addr_p2p(struct ovpn_priv *ovpn, rcu_read_lock(); tmp = rcu_dereference(ovpn->peer); if (likely(tmp && ovpn_peer_transp_match(tmp, ss) && - ovpn_peer_hold(tmp))) + ovpn_peer_hold_rcu(tmp))) peer = tmp; rcu_read_unlock(); @@ -610,7 +620,7 @@ struct ovpn_peer *ovpn_peer_get_by_transp_addr(struct ovpn_priv *ovpn, if (!ovpn_peer_transp_match(tmp, &ss)) continue; - if (!ovpn_peer_hold(tmp)) + if (!ovpn_peer_hold_rcu(tmp)) continue; peer = tmp; @@ -641,7 +651,7 @@ static struct ovpn_peer *ovpn_peer_get_by_id_p2p(struct ovpn_priv *ovpn, rcu_read_lock(); tmp = rcu_dereference(ovpn->peer); - if (likely(tmp && tmp->id == peer_id && ovpn_peer_hold(tmp))) + if (likely(tmp && tmp->id == peer_id && ovpn_peer_hold_rcu(tmp))) peer = tmp; rcu_read_unlock(); @@ -671,7 +681,7 @@ struct ovpn_peer *ovpn_peer_get_by_id(struct ovpn_priv *ovpn, u32 peer_id) if (tmp->id != peer_id) continue; - if (!ovpn_peer_hold(tmp)) + if (!ovpn_peer_hold_rcu(tmp)) continue; peer = tmp; @@ -745,7 +755,7 @@ struct ovpn_peer *ovpn_peer_get_by_dst(struct ovpn_priv *ovpn, if (ovpn->mode == OVPN_MODE_P2P) { rcu_read_lock(); peer = rcu_dereference(ovpn->peer); - if (unlikely(peer && !ovpn_peer_hold(peer))) + if (unlikely(peer && !ovpn_peer_hold_rcu(peer))) peer = NULL; rcu_read_unlock(); return peer; @@ -763,7 +773,7 @@ struct ovpn_peer *ovpn_peer_get_by_dst(struct ovpn_priv *ovpn, break; } - if (unlikely(peer && !ovpn_peer_hold(peer))) + if (unlikely(peer && !ovpn_peer_hold_rcu(peer))) peer = NULL; rcu_read_unlock(); @@ -1369,8 +1379,7 @@ static time64_t ovpn_peer_keepalive_work_single(struct ovpn_peer *peer, netdev_dbg(peer->ovpn->dev, "sending keepalive to peer %u\n", peer->id); - if (WARN_ON(!ovpn_peer_hold(peer))) - return 0; + ovpn_peer_hold(peer); if (!queue_work(ovpn_wq, &peer->keepalive_work)) ovpn_peer_put(peer); } diff --git a/drivers/net/ovpn/peer.h b/drivers/net/ovpn/peer.h index dfa5c0037e02..489bf2646684 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ovpn/peer.h +++ b/drivers/net/ovpn/peer.h @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ #ifndef _NET_OVPN_OVPNPEER_H_ #define _NET_OVPN_OVPNPEER_H_ +#include #include #include @@ -110,7 +111,7 @@ struct ovpn_peer { struct ovpn_peer_stats link_stats; enum ovpn_del_peer_reason delete_reason; spinlock_t lock; /* protects bind and keepalive* */ - struct kref refcount; + struct percpu_ref refcount; struct rcu_head rcu; struct llist_node release_entry; struct work_struct keepalive_work; @@ -120,14 +121,26 @@ struct ovpn_peer { * ovpn_peer_hold - increase reference counter * @peer: the peer whose counter should be increased * - * Return: true if the counter was increased or false if it was zero already + * The caller must already own a peer reference or otherwise guarantee that + * teardown cannot complete while the new reference is acquired. */ -static inline bool ovpn_peer_hold(struct ovpn_peer *peer) +static inline void ovpn_peer_hold(struct ovpn_peer *peer) { - return kref_get_unless_zero(&peer->refcount); + percpu_ref_get(&peer->refcount); } -void ovpn_peer_release_kref(struct kref *kref); +/** + * ovpn_peer_hold_rcu - acquire a live peer reference under RCU + * @peer: peer to acquire + * + * The caller must hold rcu_read_lock. + * + * Return: true if the reference was acquired, false if teardown has started + */ +static inline bool ovpn_peer_hold_rcu(struct ovpn_peer *peer) +{ + return percpu_ref_tryget_live_rcu(&peer->refcount); +} /** * ovpn_peer_put - decrease reference counter @@ -135,7 +148,19 @@ void ovpn_peer_release_kref(struct kref *kref); */ static inline void ovpn_peer_put(struct ovpn_peer *peer) { - kref_put(&peer->refcount, ovpn_peer_release_kref); + percpu_ref_put(&peer->refcount); +} + +/** + * ovpn_peer_kill - drop the peer's initial reference + * @peer: peer which has been unpublished and is being destroyed + * + * This must be called exactly once, after the peer is no longer reachable + * through its owning ovpn instance. + */ +static inline void ovpn_peer_kill(struct ovpn_peer *peer) +{ + percpu_ref_kill(&peer->refcount); } struct ovpn_peer *ovpn_peer_new(struct ovpn_priv *ovpn, u32 id); diff --git a/drivers/net/ovpn/tcp.c b/drivers/net/ovpn/tcp.c index 8fe8a8e750a4..29981c0279e2 100644 --- a/drivers/net/ovpn/tcp.c +++ b/drivers/net/ovpn/tcp.c @@ -140,21 +140,18 @@ static void ovpn_tcp_rcv(struct strparser *strp, struct sk_buff *skb) /* hold reference to peer as required by ovpn_recv(). * * NOTE: in this context we should already be holding a reference to - * this peer, therefore ovpn_peer_hold() is not expected to fail + * this peer */ - if (WARN_ON(!ovpn_peer_hold(peer))) - goto err_nopeer; + ovpn_peer_hold(peer); ovpn_recv(peer, skb); return; err: - /* take reference for deferred peer deletion. should never fail */ - if (WARN_ON(!ovpn_peer_hold(peer))) - goto err_nopeer; + /* take reference for deferred peer deletion */ + ovpn_peer_hold(peer); if (!queue_work(ovpn_wq, &peer->tcp.defer_del_work)) ovpn_peer_put(peer); ovpn_dev_dstats_rx_dropped(peer->ovpn->dev); -err_nopeer: kfree_skb(skb); } @@ -168,7 +165,8 @@ static int ovpn_tcp_recvmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t len, rcu_read_lock(); sock = rcu_dereference_sk_user_data(sk); - if (unlikely(!sock || !sock->peer || !ovpn_peer_hold(sock->peer))) { + if (unlikely(!sock || !sock->peer || + !ovpn_peer_hold_rcu(sock->peer))) { rcu_read_unlock(); return -EBADF; } @@ -385,7 +383,7 @@ static void ovpn_tcp_release(struct sock *sk) /* during initialization this function is called before * assigning sock->peer */ - if (unlikely(!peer || !ovpn_peer_hold(peer))) { + if (unlikely(!peer || !ovpn_peer_hold_rcu(peer))) { rcu_read_unlock(); return; } @@ -411,7 +409,8 @@ static int ovpn_tcp_sendmsg(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg, size_t size) lock_sock(sk); rcu_read_lock(); sock = rcu_dereference_sk_user_data(sk); - if (unlikely(!sock || !sock->peer || !ovpn_peer_hold(sock->peer))) { + if (unlikely(!sock || !sock->peer || + !ovpn_peer_hold_rcu(sock->peer))) { rcu_read_unlock(); release_sock(sk); return -EIO; @@ -588,7 +587,7 @@ static void ovpn_tcp_close(struct sock *sk, long timeout) } peer = sock->peer; - if (!peer || !ovpn_peer_hold(peer)) { + if (!peer || !ovpn_peer_hold_rcu(peer)) { rcu_read_unlock(); return; } @@ -619,7 +618,7 @@ static __poll_t ovpn_tcp_poll(struct file *file, struct socket *sock, return 0; } - if (ovpn_peer_hold(ovpn_sock->peer)) { + if (ovpn_peer_hold_rcu(ovpn_sock->peer)) { peer = ovpn_sock->peer; queue = &peer->tcp.user_queue; }