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[99.228.215.92]) by smtp.gmail.com with ESMTPSA id n129sm1449869itb.20.2019.01.30.07.53.59 (version=TLS1_2 cipher=ECDHE-RSA-AES128-SHA bits=128/128); Wed, 30 Jan 2019 07:53:59 -0800 (PST) From: selva.nair@gmail.com To: openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net Date: Wed, 30 Jan 2019 10:53:20 -0500 Message-Id: <1548863600-491-1-git-send-email-selva.nair@gmail.com> X-Mailer: git-send-email 2.1.4 In-Reply-To: <1548265738-11004-1-git-send-email-selva.nair@gmail.com> References: <1548265738-11004-1-git-send-email-selva.nair@gmail.com> X-Spam-Report: Spam Filtering performed by mx.sourceforge.net. See http://spamassassin.org/tag/ for more details. 0.0 FREEMAIL_FROM Sender email is commonly abused enduser mail provider (selva.nair[at]gmail.com) -0.0 RCVD_IN_DNSWL_NONE RBL: Sender listed at http://www.dnswl.org/, no trust [209.85.166.182 listed in list.dnswl.org] -0.0 SPF_PASS SPF: sender matches SPF record -0.1 DKIM_VALID_AU Message has a valid DKIM or DK signature from author's domain -0.1 DKIM_VALID Message has at least one valid DKIM or DK signature 0.1 DKIM_SIGNED Message has a DKIM or DK signature, not necessarily valid X-Headers-End: 1gosBi-00DzoJ-EV Subject: [Openvpn-devel] [PATCH 2/2 v3] Handle PSS padding in cryptoapicert X-BeenThere: openvpn-devel@lists.sourceforge.net X-Mailman-Version: 2.1.21 Precedence: list List-Id: List-Unsubscribe: , List-Archive: List-Post: List-Help: List-Subscribe: , MIME-Version: 1.0 Errors-To: openvpn-devel-bounces@lists.sourceforge.net X-getmail-retrieved-from-mailbox: Inbox From: Selva Nair For PSS padding, CNG requires the digest to be signed and the digest algorithm in use, which are not accessible via the rsa_sign and rsa_priv_enc callbacks of OpenSSL. This patch uses the EVP_KEY interface to hook to evp_pkey_sign callback if OpenSSL version is > 1.1.0. To test this code path, both the server and client should be built with OpenSSL 1.1.1 and use TLS version >= 1.2 Tested on Windows 7 client against a Linux server. Signed-off-by: Selva Nair Acked-By: Arne Schwabe --- v2: Changes: - Meaningless call to EVP_MD_size() removed. - /** for function doc strings - Multiline comments: beginning /* and ending */ left blank - White space in cast as (TYPE)foo and (TYPE *)bar - Some extra white-space changes suggested by uncrustify v3 changes - rebase to current master src/openvpn/cryptoapi.c | 267 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--- 1 file changed, 252 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) diff --git a/src/openvpn/cryptoapi.c b/src/openvpn/cryptoapi.c index 55902ae..0c11712 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/cryptoapi.c +++ b/src/openvpn/cryptoapi.c @@ -40,6 +40,7 @@ #ifdef ENABLE_CRYPTOAPI #include +#include #include #include #include @@ -105,6 +106,12 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA CRYPTOAPI_str_functs[] = { /* index for storing external data in EC_KEY: < 0 means uninitialized */ static int ec_data_idx = -1; +/* Global EVP_PKEY_METHOD used to override the sign operation */ +static EVP_PKEY_METHOD *pmethod; +static int (*default_pkey_sign_init) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx); +static int (*default_pkey_sign) (EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, + size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen); + typedef struct _CAPI_DATA { const CERT_CONTEXT *cert_context; HCRYPTPROV_OR_NCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE crypt_prov; @@ -177,6 +184,7 @@ cng_hash_algo(int md_type) case 0: alg = NULL; break; + default: msg(M_WARN|M_INFO, "cryptoapicert: Unknown hash type NID=0x%x", md_type); break; @@ -320,28 +328,44 @@ rsa_pub_dec(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, in * Sign the hash in 'from' using NCryptSignHash(). This requires an NCRYPT * key handle in cd->crypt_prov. On return the signature is in 'to'. Returns * the length of the signature or 0 on error. + * This is used only for RSA and padding should be BCRYPT_PAD_PKCS1 or + * BCRYPT_PAD_PSS. * If the hash_algo is not NULL, PKCS #1 DigestInfo header gets added - * to 'from', else it is signed as is. - * For now we support only RSA and the padding is assumed to be PKCS1 v1.5 + * to |from|, else it is signed as is. Use NULL for MD5 + SHA1 hash used + * in TLS 1.1 and earlier. + * In case of PSS padding, |saltlen| should specify the size of salt to use. + * If |to| is NULL returns the required buffer size. */ static int priv_enc_CNG(const CAPI_DATA *cd, const wchar_t *hash_algo, const unsigned char *from, - int flen, unsigned char *to, int tlen, DWORD padding) + int flen, unsigned char *to, int tlen, DWORD padding, DWORD saltlen) { NCRYPT_KEY_HANDLE hkey = cd->crypt_prov; DWORD len = 0; ASSERT(cd->key_spec == CERT_NCRYPT_KEY_SPEC); - msg(D_LOW, "Signing hash using CNG: data size = %d", flen); - - /* The hash OID is already in 'from'. So set the hash algorithm - * in the padding info struct to NULL. - */ - BCRYPT_PKCS1_PADDING_INFO padinfo = {hash_algo}; DWORD status; - status = NCryptSignHash(hkey, padding ? &padinfo : NULL, (BYTE *) from, flen, - to, tlen, &len, padding); + msg(D_LOW, "Signing hash using CNG: data size = %d padding = %lu", flen, padding); + + if (padding == BCRYPT_PAD_PKCS1) + { + BCRYPT_PKCS1_PADDING_INFO padinfo = {hash_algo}; + status = NCryptSignHash(hkey, &padinfo, (BYTE *)from, flen, + to, tlen, &len, padding); + } + else if (padding == BCRYPT_PAD_PSS) + { + BCRYPT_PSS_PADDING_INFO padinfo = {hash_algo, saltlen}; + status = NCryptSignHash(hkey, &padinfo, (BYTE *)from, flen, + to, tlen, &len, padding); + } + else + { + RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); + return 0; + } + if (status != ERROR_SUCCESS) { SetLastError(status); @@ -367,16 +391,18 @@ rsa_priv_enc(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, i RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER); return 0; } + if (padding != RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) { /* AFAICS, CryptSignHash() *always* uses PKCS1 padding. */ RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE); return 0; } + if (cd->key_spec == CERT_NCRYPT_KEY_SPEC) { return priv_enc_CNG(cd, NULL, from, flen, to, RSA_size(rsa), - cng_padding_type(padding)); + cng_padding_type(padding), 0); } /* Unfortunately, there is no "CryptSign()" function in CryptoAPI, that would @@ -440,12 +466,13 @@ rsa_priv_enc(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, i return len; } -/* +/** * Sign the hash in |m| and return the signature in |sig|. * Returns 1 on success, 0 on error. * NCryptSignHash() is used to sign and it is instructed to add the * the PKCS #1 DigestInfo header to |m| unless the hash algorithm is * the MD5/SHA1 combination used in TLS 1.1 and earlier versions. + * OpenSSL exercises this callback only when padding is PKCS1 v1.5. */ static int rsa_sign_CNG(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, @@ -470,7 +497,7 @@ rsa_sign_CNG(int type, const unsigned char *m, unsigned int m_len, } *siglen = priv_enc_CNG(cd, alg, m, (int)m_len, sig, RSA_size(rsa), - cng_padding_type(padding)); + cng_padding_type(padding), 0); return (siglen == 0) ? 0 : 1; } @@ -778,6 +805,179 @@ find_certificate_in_store(const char *cert_prop, HCERTSTORE cert_store) return rv; } +#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x10100000L) + +static const CAPI_DATA * +retrieve_capi_data(EVP_PKEY *pkey) +{ + const CAPI_DATA *cd = NULL; + + if (pkey && EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_RSA) + { + RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey); + if (rsa) + { + cd = (CAPI_DATA *)RSA_meth_get0_app_data(RSA_get_method(rsa)); + } + } + return cd; +} + +static int +pkey_rsa_sign_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx) +{ + msg(D_LOW, "cryptoapicert: enter pkey_rsa_sign_init"); + + EVP_PKEY *pkey = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(ctx); + + if (pkey && retrieve_capi_data(pkey)) + { + return 1; /* Return success */ + } + else if (default_pkey_sign_init) /* Not our key. Call the default method */ + { + return default_pkey_sign_init(ctx); + } + return 1; +} + +/** + * Implementation of EVP_PKEY_sign() using CNG: sign the digest in |tbs| + * and save the the signature in |sig| and its size in |*siglen|. + * If |sig| is NULL the required buffer size is returned in |*siglen|. + * Returns value is 1 on success, 0 or a negative integer on error. + */ +static int +pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig, size_t *siglen, + const unsigned char *tbs, size_t tbslen) +{ + EVP_PKEY *pkey = NULL; + const CAPI_DATA *cd = NULL; + EVP_MD *md = NULL; + const wchar_t *alg = NULL; + + int padding; + int hashlen; + int saltlen; + + pkey = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(ctx); + if (pkey) + { + cd = retrieve_capi_data(pkey); + } + + /* + * We intercept all sign requests, not just the one's for our key. + * Check the key and call the saved OpenSSL method for unknown keys. + */ + if (!pkey || !cd) + { + if (default_pkey_sign) + { + return default_pkey_sign(ctx, sig, siglen, tbs, tbslen); + } + else /* This should not happen */ + { + msg(M_FATAL, "cryptopaicert: Unknown key and no default sign operation to fallback on"); + return -1; + } + } + + if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(ctx, &padding)) + { + padding = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING; /* Default padding for RSA */ + } + + if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_signature_md(ctx, &md)) + { + hashlen = EVP_MD_size(md); + alg = cng_hash_algo(EVP_MD_type(md)); + + /* + * alg == NULL indicates legacy MD5+SHA1 hash, else alg should be a valid + * digest algorithm. + */ + if (alg && wcscmp(alg, L"UNKNOWN") == 0) + { + RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); + return -1; + } + } + else + { + msg(M_NONFATAL, "cryptoapicert: could not determine the signature digest algorithm"); + RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE); + return -1; + } + + if (tbslen != (size_t)hashlen) + { + RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH); + return -1; + } + + /* If padding is PSS, determine parameters to pass to CNG */ + if (padding == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) + { + /* + * Ensure the digest type for signature and mask generation match. + * In CNG there is no option to specify separate hash functions for + * the two, but OpenSSL supports it. However, I have not seen the + * two being different in practice. Also the recommended practice is + * to use the same for both (rfc 8017 sec 8.1). + */ + EVP_MD *mgf1md; + if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(ctx, &mgf1md) + || EVP_MD_type(mgf1md) != EVP_MD_type(md)) + { + msg(M_NONFATAL, "cryptoapicert: Unknown MGF1 digest type or does" + " not match the signature digest type."); + RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_PARAMETER); + } + + if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(ctx, &saltlen)) + { + msg(M_WARN, "cryptoapicert: unable to get the salt length from context." + " Using the default value."); + saltlen = -1; + } + + /* + * In OpenSSL saltlen = -1 indicates to use the size of the digest as + * size of the salt. A value of -2 or -3 indicates maximum salt length + * that will fit. See RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1() of OpenSSL. + */ + if (saltlen == -1) + { + saltlen = hashlen; + } + else if (saltlen < 0) + { + const RSA *rsa = EVP_PKEY_get0_RSA(pkey); + saltlen = RSA_size(rsa) - hashlen - 2; /* max salt length for RSASSA-PSS */ + if (RSA_bits(rsa) &0x7) /* number of bits in the key not a multiple of 8 */ + { + saltlen--; + } + } + + if (saltlen < 0) + { + RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE); + return -1; + } + msg(D_LOW, "cryptoapicert: PSS padding using saltlen = %d", saltlen); + } + + msg(D_LOW, "cryptoapicert: calling priv_enc_CNG with alg = %ls", alg); + *siglen = priv_enc_CNG(cd, alg, tbs, (int)tbslen, sig, *siglen, + cng_padding_type(padding), (DWORD)saltlen); + + return (siglen == 0) ? 0 : 1; +} + +#endif /* OPENSSL_VERSION >= 1.1.0 */ + static int ssl_ctx_set_rsakey(SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx, CAPI_DATA *cd, EVP_PKEY *pkey) { @@ -796,13 +996,50 @@ ssl_ctx_set_rsakey(SSL_CTX *ssl_ctx, CAPI_DATA *cd, EVP_PKEY *pkey) RSA_meth_set_finish(my_rsa_method, finish); RSA_meth_set0_app_data(my_rsa_method, cd); - /* For CNG, set the RSA_sign method which gets priority over priv_enc(). + /* + * For CNG, set the RSA_sign method which gets priority over priv_enc(). * This method is called with the raw hash without the digestinfo * header and works better when using NCryptSignHash() with some tokens. + * However, if PSS padding is in use, openssl does not call this + * function but adds the padding and then calls rsa_priv_enc() + * with padding set to NONE which is not supported by CNG. + * So, when posisble (OpenSSL 1.1.0 and up), we hook on to the sign + * operation in EVP_PKEY_METHOD struct. */ if (cd->key_spec == CERT_NCRYPT_KEY_SPEC) { +#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L) RSA_meth_set_sign(my_rsa_method, rsa_sign_CNG); +#else + /* pmethod is global -- initialize only if NULL */ + if (!pmethod) + { + pmethod = EVP_PKEY_meth_new(EVP_PKEY_RSA, 0); + if (!pmethod) + { + SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_USE_CERTIFICATE_FILE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE); + goto err; + } + const EVP_PKEY_METHOD *default_pmethod = EVP_PKEY_meth_find(EVP_PKEY_RSA); + EVP_PKEY_meth_copy(pmethod, default_pmethod); + + /* We want to override only sign_init() and sign() */ + EVP_PKEY_meth_set_sign(pmethod, pkey_rsa_sign_init, pkey_rsa_sign); + EVP_PKEY_meth_add0(pmethod); + + /* Keep a copy of the default sign and sign_init methods */ + +#if (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x1010009fL) /* > version 1.1.0i */ + /* The function signature is not const-correct in these versions */ + EVP_PKEY_meth_get_sign((EVP_PKEY_METHOD *)default_pmethod, &default_pkey_sign_init, + &default_pkey_sign); +#else + EVP_PKEY_meth_get_sign(default_pmethod, &default_pkey_sign_init, + &default_pkey_sign); + +#endif + } +#endif /* (OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100000L) */ } rsa = RSA_new();