| Message ID | 20210325000121.10331-2-arne@rfc2549.org |
|---|---|
| State | Changes Requested |
| Headers | show |
| Series | [Openvpn-devel,1/2] Deprecate non TLS mode in OpenVPN | expand |
Hi, On 25/03/2021 01:01, Arne Schwabe wrote: > This option has been deprecated in OpenVPN 2.4 and the ciphers that allow > using this option fall all into the SWEET32 category of ciphers with > 64 bit block size. > > Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe <arne@rfc2549.org> > --- > config-msvc.h | 1 - > configure.ac | 2 +- > src/openvpn/crypto.c | 6 +----- > src/openvpn/crypto.h | 4 +--- > src/openvpn/crypto_openssl.c | 4 ++-- > src/openvpn/init.c | 5 ++--- > src/openvpn/options.c | 33 ++------------------------------- > src/openvpn/options.h | 2 -- > src/openvpn/ssl.c | 7 +------ > 9 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-) > > diff --git a/config-msvc.h b/config-msvc.h > index e430ca96..d0aa4438 100644 > --- a/config-msvc.h > +++ b/config-msvc.h > @@ -49,7 +49,6 @@ > #define HAVE_CHSIZE 1 > #define HAVE_CPP_VARARG_MACRO_ISO 1 > #define HAVE_CTIME 1 > -#define HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_KEY_LENGTH 1 > #define HAVE_IN_PKTINFO 1 > #define HAVE_MEMSET 1 > #define HAVE_PUTENV 1 > diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac > index 428bebed..bd592b3f 100644 > --- a/configure.ac > +++ b/configure.ac > @@ -881,7 +881,7 @@ if test "${with_crypto_library}" = "openssl"; then > ) > fi > > - AC_CHECK_FUNCS([SSL_CTX_new EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length], > + AC_CHECK_FUNCS([SSL_CTX_new], > , > [AC_MSG_ERROR([openssl check failed])] > ) > diff --git a/src/openvpn/crypto.c b/src/openvpn/crypto.c > index 3a0bfbec..b042514b 100644 > --- a/src/openvpn/crypto.c > +++ b/src/openvpn/crypto.c > @@ -739,7 +739,7 @@ warn_insecure_key_type(const char *ciphername, const cipher_kt_t *cipher) > */ > void > init_key_type(struct key_type *kt, const char *ciphername, > - const char *authname, int keysize, bool tls_mode, bool warn) > + const char *authname, bool tls_mode, bool warn) > { > bool aead_cipher = false; > > @@ -756,10 +756,6 @@ init_key_type(struct key_type *kt, const char *ciphername, > } > > kt->cipher_length = cipher_kt_key_size(kt->cipher); > - if (keysize > 0 && keysize <= MAX_CIPHER_KEY_LENGTH) > - { > - kt->cipher_length = keysize; > - } > > /* check legal cipher mode */ > aead_cipher = cipher_kt_mode_aead(kt->cipher); > diff --git a/src/openvpn/crypto.h b/src/openvpn/crypto.h > index 1ad669ce..b8128c7f 100644 > --- a/src/openvpn/crypto.h > +++ b/src/openvpn/crypto.h > @@ -301,14 +301,12 @@ int read_key(struct key *key, const struct key_type *kt, struct buffer *buf); > * @param kt The struct key_type to initialize > * @param ciphername The name of the cipher to use > * @param authname The name of the HMAC digest to use > - * @param keysize The length of the cipher key to use, in bytes. Only valid > - * for ciphers that support variable length keys. > * @param tls_mode Specifies whether we are running in TLS mode, which allows > * more ciphers than static key mode. > * @param warn Print warnings when null cipher / auth is used. > */ > void init_key_type(struct key_type *kt, const char *ciphername, > - const char *authname, int keysize, bool tls_mode, bool warn); > + const char *authname, bool tls_mode, bool warn); > > /* > * Key context functions > diff --git a/src/openvpn/crypto_openssl.c b/src/openvpn/crypto_openssl.c > index 573beaed..34decbb0 100644 > --- a/src/openvpn/crypto_openssl.c > +++ b/src/openvpn/crypto_openssl.c > @@ -776,12 +776,12 @@ cipher_ctx_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key, int key_len, > { > crypto_msg(M_FATAL, "EVP cipher init #1"); > } > -#ifdef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_KEY_LENGTH > + /* This serves as a check that the keylen is the correct as this fails > + * when key_len and the fixed size of cipher disagree */ > if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx, key_len)) Are you sure we need to keep this check? key_len is basically kt->cipher_length, which (after his patch) is assigned by the SSL library itself after having initialized the cipher. At a first glance, the rest looks good to me. Cheers, > { > crypto_msg(M_FATAL, "EVP set key size"); > } > -#endif > if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, enc)) > { > crypto_msg(M_FATAL, "EVP cipher init #2"); > diff --git a/src/openvpn/init.c b/src/openvpn/init.c > index 132d47e4..336da941 100644 > --- a/src/openvpn/init.c > +++ b/src/openvpn/init.c > @@ -2599,7 +2599,7 @@ do_init_crypto_static(struct context *c, const unsigned int flags) > { > /* Get cipher & hash algorithms */ > init_key_type(&c->c1.ks.key_type, options->ciphername, options->authname, > - options->keysize, options->test_crypto, true); > + options->test_crypto, true); > > /* Read cipher and hmac keys from shared secret file */ > crypto_read_openvpn_key(&c->c1.ks.key_type, &c->c1.ks.static_key, > @@ -2751,7 +2751,7 @@ do_init_crypto_tls_c1(struct context *c) > || options->enable_ncp_fallback; > /* Get cipher & hash algorithms */ > init_key_type(&c->c1.ks.key_type, options->ciphername, options->authname, > - options->keysize, true, warn); > + true, warn); > > /* Initialize PRNG with config-specified digest */ > prng_init(options->prng_hash, options->prng_nonce_secret_len); > @@ -4515,7 +4515,6 @@ inherit_context_child(struct context *dest, > /* inherit pre-NCP ciphers */ > dest->options.ciphername = src->options.ciphername; > dest->options.authname = src->options.authname; > - dest->options.keysize = src->options.keysize; > > /* inherit auth-token */ > dest->c1.ks.auth_token_key = src->c1.ks.auth_token_key; > diff --git a/src/openvpn/options.c b/src/openvpn/options.c > index 5b559edf..7948f4a5 100644 > --- a/src/openvpn/options.c > +++ b/src/openvpn/options.c > @@ -531,10 +531,6 @@ static const char usage_message[] = > "--ncp-disable : (DEPRECATED) Disable cipher negotiation.\n" > "--prng alg [nsl] : For PRNG, use digest algorithm alg, and\n" > " nonce_secret_len=nsl. Set alg=none to disable PRNG.\n" > -#ifdef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_KEY_LENGTH > - "--keysize n : (DEPRECATED) Size of cipher key in bits (optional).\n" > - " If unspecified, defaults to cipher-specific default.\n" > -#endif > #ifndef ENABLE_CRYPTO_MBEDTLS > "--engine [name] : Enable OpenSSL hardware crypto engine functionality.\n" > #endif > @@ -1733,7 +1729,6 @@ show_settings(const struct options *o) > SHOW_STR(authname); > SHOW_STR(prng_hash); > SHOW_INT(prng_nonce_secret_len); > - SHOW_INT(keysize); > #ifndef ENABLE_CRYPTO_MBEDTLS > SHOW_BOOL(engine); > #endif /* ENABLE_CRYPTO_MBEDTLS */ > @@ -2540,11 +2535,6 @@ options_postprocess_verify_ce(const struct options *options, > } > } > > - if (options->keysize) > - { > - msg(M_WARN, "WARNING: --keysize is DEPRECATED and will be removed in OpenVPN 2.6"); > - } > - > /* > * Check consistency of replay options > */ > @@ -3619,7 +3609,6 @@ pre_pull_save(struct options *o) > /* NCP related options that can be overwritten by a push */ > o->pre_pull->ciphername = o->ciphername; > o->pre_pull->authname = o->authname; > - o->pre_pull->keysize = o->keysize; > > /* Ping related options should be reset to the config values on reconnect */ > o->pre_pull->ping_rec_timeout = o->ping_rec_timeout; > @@ -3675,7 +3664,6 @@ pre_pull_restore(struct options *o, struct gc_arena *gc) > > o->ciphername = pp->ciphername; > o->authname = pp->authname; > - o->keysize = pp->keysize; > > o->ping_rec_timeout = pp->ping_rec_timeout; > o->ping_rec_timeout_action = pp->ping_rec_timeout_action; > @@ -3704,8 +3692,7 @@ calc_options_string_link_mtu(const struct options *o, const struct frame *frame) > { > struct frame fake_frame = *frame; > struct key_type fake_kt; > - init_key_type(&fake_kt, o->ciphername, o->authname, o->keysize, true, > - false); > + init_key_type(&fake_kt, o->ciphername, o->authname, true, false); > frame_remove_from_extra_frame(&fake_frame, crypto_max_overhead()); > crypto_adjust_frame_parameters(&fake_frame, &fake_kt, o->replay, > cipher_kt_mode_ofb_cfb(fake_kt.cipher)); > @@ -3876,8 +3863,7 @@ options_string(const struct options *o, > + (TLS_SERVER == true) > <= 1); > > - init_key_type(&kt, o->ciphername, o->authname, o->keysize, true, > - false); > + init_key_type(&kt, o->ciphername, o->authname, true, false); > /* Only announce the cipher to our peer if we are willing to > * support it */ > const char *ciphername = cipher_kt_name(kt.cipher); > @@ -8087,21 +8073,6 @@ add_option(struct options *options, > } > } > #endif /* ENABLE_CRYPTO_MBEDTLS */ > -#ifdef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_KEY_LENGTH > - else if (streq(p[0], "keysize") && p[1] && !p[2]) > - { > - int keysize; > - > - VERIFY_PERMISSION(OPT_P_NCP); > - keysize = atoi(p[1]) / 8; > - if (keysize < 0 || keysize > MAX_CIPHER_KEY_LENGTH) > - { > - msg(msglevel, "Bad keysize: %s", p[1]); > - goto err; > - } > - options->keysize = keysize; > - } > -#endif > #ifdef ENABLE_PREDICTION_RESISTANCE > else if (streq(p[0], "use-prediction-resistance") && !p[1]) > { > diff --git a/src/openvpn/options.h b/src/openvpn/options.h > index d8e91fbc..5e924e1b 100644 > --- a/src/openvpn/options.h > +++ b/src/openvpn/options.h > @@ -77,7 +77,6 @@ struct options_pre_pull > > const char* ciphername; > const char* authname; > - int keysize; > > int ping_send_timeout; > int ping_rec_timeout; > @@ -521,7 +520,6 @@ struct options > bool ncp_enabled; > const char *ncp_ciphers; > const char *authname; > - int keysize; > const char *prng_hash; > int prng_nonce_secret_len; > const char *engine; > diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl.c b/src/openvpn/ssl.c > index 0daf19ad..d288d207 100644 > --- a/src/openvpn/ssl.c > +++ b/src/openvpn/ssl.c > @@ -1874,11 +1874,6 @@ tls_session_update_crypto_params(struct tls_session *session, > { > msg(D_HANDSHAKE, "Data Channel: using negotiated cipher '%s'", > options->ciphername); > - if (options->keysize) > - { > - msg(D_HANDSHAKE, "NCP: overriding user-set keysize with default"); > - options->keysize = 0; > - } > } > else > { > @@ -1889,7 +1884,7 @@ tls_session_update_crypto_params(struct tls_session *session, > } > > init_key_type(&session->opt->key_type, options->ciphername, > - options->authname, options->keysize, true, true); > + options->authname, true, true); > > bool packet_id_long_form = cipher_kt_mode_ofb_cfb(session->opt->key_type.cipher); > session->opt->crypto_flags &= ~(CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM); >
Hi, On Fri, Mar 26, 2021 at 12:12:40AM +0100, Antonio Quartulli wrote: > > -#ifdef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_KEY_LENGTH > > + /* This serves as a check that the keylen is the correct as this fails > > + * when key_len and the fixed size of cipher disagree */ > > if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx, key_len)) > > Are you sure we need to keep this check? Indeed, that also got me wondering (and is the reason why I didn't just ack-and-merge it right away :-) - but I was waiting for someone else to understand and ACK this) gert
Am 26.03.21 um 07:58 schrieb Gert Doering: > Hi, > > On Fri, Mar 26, 2021 at 12:12:40AM +0100, Antonio Quartulli wrote: >>> -#ifdef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_KEY_LENGTH >>> + /* This serves as a check that the keylen is the correct as this fails >>> + * when key_len and the fixed size of cipher disagree */ >>> if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx, key_len)) >> >> Are you sure we need to keep this check? > > Indeed, that also got me wondering (and is the reason why I didn't > just ack-and-merge it right away :-) - but I was waiting for someone > else to understand and ACK this) > The reason I kept it that it doesn't hurt but fails if something fishy happend in cipher handling. For mbed TLS the check is more useful as it doesn't set the keylen before doing this check. Arne
Hi, On 26/03/2021 12:05, Arne Schwabe wrote: > Am 26.03.21 um 07:58 schrieb Gert Doering: >> Hi, >> >> On Fri, Mar 26, 2021 at 12:12:40AM +0100, Antonio Quartulli wrote: >>>> -#ifdef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_KEY_LENGTH >>>> + /* This serves as a check that the keylen is the correct as this fails >>>> + * when key_len and the fixed size of cipher disagree */ >>>> if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx, key_len)) >>> >>> Are you sure we need to keep this check? >> >> Indeed, that also got me wondering (and is the reason why I didn't >> just ack-and-merge it right away :-) - but I was waiting for someone >> else to understand and ACK this) >> > > The reason I kept it that it doesn't hurt but fails if something fishy > happend in cipher handling. For mbed TLS the check is more useful as it > doesn't set the keylen before doing this check. > I'd dare to say that if we don't trust OpenSSL in returning a meaningful key length, I am not sure why we should trust it when calling EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length. If OpenSSL went cocoon, more calls will fail for sure. This said, if you really wanna stick with EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length, I presume you should add it back to the configure.ac and you should also add again the ifdef around the invocation? Or that's not needed in this case? Regarding mbedtls I am not sure how it is related to calling EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length. Cheers!
> > Regarding mbedtls I am not sure how it is related to calling > EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length. > That was probably misleading. I wanted to say that the mbed variant of this function actually still has a more useful check in this function. So I wanted to keep both checks rather than to remove both. Arne
diff --git a/config-msvc.h b/config-msvc.h index e430ca96..d0aa4438 100644 --- a/config-msvc.h +++ b/config-msvc.h @@ -49,7 +49,6 @@ #define HAVE_CHSIZE 1 #define HAVE_CPP_VARARG_MACRO_ISO 1 #define HAVE_CTIME 1 -#define HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_KEY_LENGTH 1 #define HAVE_IN_PKTINFO 1 #define HAVE_MEMSET 1 #define HAVE_PUTENV 1 diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac index 428bebed..bd592b3f 100644 --- a/configure.ac +++ b/configure.ac @@ -881,7 +881,7 @@ if test "${with_crypto_library}" = "openssl"; then ) fi - AC_CHECK_FUNCS([SSL_CTX_new EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length], + AC_CHECK_FUNCS([SSL_CTX_new], , [AC_MSG_ERROR([openssl check failed])] ) diff --git a/src/openvpn/crypto.c b/src/openvpn/crypto.c index 3a0bfbec..b042514b 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/crypto.c +++ b/src/openvpn/crypto.c @@ -739,7 +739,7 @@ warn_insecure_key_type(const char *ciphername, const cipher_kt_t *cipher) */ void init_key_type(struct key_type *kt, const char *ciphername, - const char *authname, int keysize, bool tls_mode, bool warn) + const char *authname, bool tls_mode, bool warn) { bool aead_cipher = false; @@ -756,10 +756,6 @@ init_key_type(struct key_type *kt, const char *ciphername, } kt->cipher_length = cipher_kt_key_size(kt->cipher); - if (keysize > 0 && keysize <= MAX_CIPHER_KEY_LENGTH) - { - kt->cipher_length = keysize; - } /* check legal cipher mode */ aead_cipher = cipher_kt_mode_aead(kt->cipher); diff --git a/src/openvpn/crypto.h b/src/openvpn/crypto.h index 1ad669ce..b8128c7f 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/crypto.h +++ b/src/openvpn/crypto.h @@ -301,14 +301,12 @@ int read_key(struct key *key, const struct key_type *kt, struct buffer *buf); * @param kt The struct key_type to initialize * @param ciphername The name of the cipher to use * @param authname The name of the HMAC digest to use - * @param keysize The length of the cipher key to use, in bytes. Only valid - * for ciphers that support variable length keys. * @param tls_mode Specifies whether we are running in TLS mode, which allows * more ciphers than static key mode. * @param warn Print warnings when null cipher / auth is used. */ void init_key_type(struct key_type *kt, const char *ciphername, - const char *authname, int keysize, bool tls_mode, bool warn); + const char *authname, bool tls_mode, bool warn); /* * Key context functions diff --git a/src/openvpn/crypto_openssl.c b/src/openvpn/crypto_openssl.c index 573beaed..34decbb0 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/crypto_openssl.c +++ b/src/openvpn/crypto_openssl.c @@ -776,12 +776,12 @@ cipher_ctx_init(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const uint8_t *key, int key_len, { crypto_msg(M_FATAL, "EVP cipher init #1"); } -#ifdef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_KEY_LENGTH + /* This serves as a check that the keylen is the correct as this fails + * when key_len and the fixed size of cipher disagree */ if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_key_length(ctx, key_len)) { crypto_msg(M_FATAL, "EVP set key size"); } -#endif if (!EVP_CipherInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, key, NULL, enc)) { crypto_msg(M_FATAL, "EVP cipher init #2"); diff --git a/src/openvpn/init.c b/src/openvpn/init.c index 132d47e4..336da941 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/init.c +++ b/src/openvpn/init.c @@ -2599,7 +2599,7 @@ do_init_crypto_static(struct context *c, const unsigned int flags) { /* Get cipher & hash algorithms */ init_key_type(&c->c1.ks.key_type, options->ciphername, options->authname, - options->keysize, options->test_crypto, true); + options->test_crypto, true); /* Read cipher and hmac keys from shared secret file */ crypto_read_openvpn_key(&c->c1.ks.key_type, &c->c1.ks.static_key, @@ -2751,7 +2751,7 @@ do_init_crypto_tls_c1(struct context *c) || options->enable_ncp_fallback; /* Get cipher & hash algorithms */ init_key_type(&c->c1.ks.key_type, options->ciphername, options->authname, - options->keysize, true, warn); + true, warn); /* Initialize PRNG with config-specified digest */ prng_init(options->prng_hash, options->prng_nonce_secret_len); @@ -4515,7 +4515,6 @@ inherit_context_child(struct context *dest, /* inherit pre-NCP ciphers */ dest->options.ciphername = src->options.ciphername; dest->options.authname = src->options.authname; - dest->options.keysize = src->options.keysize; /* inherit auth-token */ dest->c1.ks.auth_token_key = src->c1.ks.auth_token_key; diff --git a/src/openvpn/options.c b/src/openvpn/options.c index 5b559edf..7948f4a5 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/options.c +++ b/src/openvpn/options.c @@ -531,10 +531,6 @@ static const char usage_message[] = "--ncp-disable : (DEPRECATED) Disable cipher negotiation.\n" "--prng alg [nsl] : For PRNG, use digest algorithm alg, and\n" " nonce_secret_len=nsl. Set alg=none to disable PRNG.\n" -#ifdef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_KEY_LENGTH - "--keysize n : (DEPRECATED) Size of cipher key in bits (optional).\n" - " If unspecified, defaults to cipher-specific default.\n" -#endif #ifndef ENABLE_CRYPTO_MBEDTLS "--engine [name] : Enable OpenSSL hardware crypto engine functionality.\n" #endif @@ -1733,7 +1729,6 @@ show_settings(const struct options *o) SHOW_STR(authname); SHOW_STR(prng_hash); SHOW_INT(prng_nonce_secret_len); - SHOW_INT(keysize); #ifndef ENABLE_CRYPTO_MBEDTLS SHOW_BOOL(engine); #endif /* ENABLE_CRYPTO_MBEDTLS */ @@ -2540,11 +2535,6 @@ options_postprocess_verify_ce(const struct options *options, } } - if (options->keysize) - { - msg(M_WARN, "WARNING: --keysize is DEPRECATED and will be removed in OpenVPN 2.6"); - } - /* * Check consistency of replay options */ @@ -3619,7 +3609,6 @@ pre_pull_save(struct options *o) /* NCP related options that can be overwritten by a push */ o->pre_pull->ciphername = o->ciphername; o->pre_pull->authname = o->authname; - o->pre_pull->keysize = o->keysize; /* Ping related options should be reset to the config values on reconnect */ o->pre_pull->ping_rec_timeout = o->ping_rec_timeout; @@ -3675,7 +3664,6 @@ pre_pull_restore(struct options *o, struct gc_arena *gc) o->ciphername = pp->ciphername; o->authname = pp->authname; - o->keysize = pp->keysize; o->ping_rec_timeout = pp->ping_rec_timeout; o->ping_rec_timeout_action = pp->ping_rec_timeout_action; @@ -3704,8 +3692,7 @@ calc_options_string_link_mtu(const struct options *o, const struct frame *frame) { struct frame fake_frame = *frame; struct key_type fake_kt; - init_key_type(&fake_kt, o->ciphername, o->authname, o->keysize, true, - false); + init_key_type(&fake_kt, o->ciphername, o->authname, true, false); frame_remove_from_extra_frame(&fake_frame, crypto_max_overhead()); crypto_adjust_frame_parameters(&fake_frame, &fake_kt, o->replay, cipher_kt_mode_ofb_cfb(fake_kt.cipher)); @@ -3876,8 +3863,7 @@ options_string(const struct options *o, + (TLS_SERVER == true) <= 1); - init_key_type(&kt, o->ciphername, o->authname, o->keysize, true, - false); + init_key_type(&kt, o->ciphername, o->authname, true, false); /* Only announce the cipher to our peer if we are willing to * support it */ const char *ciphername = cipher_kt_name(kt.cipher); @@ -8087,21 +8073,6 @@ add_option(struct options *options, } } #endif /* ENABLE_CRYPTO_MBEDTLS */ -#ifdef HAVE_EVP_CIPHER_CTX_SET_KEY_LENGTH - else if (streq(p[0], "keysize") && p[1] && !p[2]) - { - int keysize; - - VERIFY_PERMISSION(OPT_P_NCP); - keysize = atoi(p[1]) / 8; - if (keysize < 0 || keysize > MAX_CIPHER_KEY_LENGTH) - { - msg(msglevel, "Bad keysize: %s", p[1]); - goto err; - } - options->keysize = keysize; - } -#endif #ifdef ENABLE_PREDICTION_RESISTANCE else if (streq(p[0], "use-prediction-resistance") && !p[1]) { diff --git a/src/openvpn/options.h b/src/openvpn/options.h index d8e91fbc..5e924e1b 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/options.h +++ b/src/openvpn/options.h @@ -77,7 +77,6 @@ struct options_pre_pull const char* ciphername; const char* authname; - int keysize; int ping_send_timeout; int ping_rec_timeout; @@ -521,7 +520,6 @@ struct options bool ncp_enabled; const char *ncp_ciphers; const char *authname; - int keysize; const char *prng_hash; int prng_nonce_secret_len; const char *engine; diff --git a/src/openvpn/ssl.c b/src/openvpn/ssl.c index 0daf19ad..d288d207 100644 --- a/src/openvpn/ssl.c +++ b/src/openvpn/ssl.c @@ -1874,11 +1874,6 @@ tls_session_update_crypto_params(struct tls_session *session, { msg(D_HANDSHAKE, "Data Channel: using negotiated cipher '%s'", options->ciphername); - if (options->keysize) - { - msg(D_HANDSHAKE, "NCP: overriding user-set keysize with default"); - options->keysize = 0; - } } else { @@ -1889,7 +1884,7 @@ tls_session_update_crypto_params(struct tls_session *session, } init_key_type(&session->opt->key_type, options->ciphername, - options->authname, options->keysize, true, true); + options->authname, true, true); bool packet_id_long_form = cipher_kt_mode_ofb_cfb(session->opt->key_type.cipher); session->opt->crypto_flags &= ~(CO_PACKET_ID_LONG_FORM);
This option has been deprecated in OpenVPN 2.4 and the ciphers that allow using this option fall all into the SWEET32 category of ciphers with 64 bit block size. Signed-off-by: Arne Schwabe <arne@rfc2549.org> --- config-msvc.h | 1 - configure.ac | 2 +- src/openvpn/crypto.c | 6 +----- src/openvpn/crypto.h | 4 +--- src/openvpn/crypto_openssl.c | 4 ++-- src/openvpn/init.c | 5 ++--- src/openvpn/options.c | 33 ++------------------------------- src/openvpn/options.h | 2 -- src/openvpn/ssl.c | 7 +------ 9 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 54 deletions(-)